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c. 1967/05/10

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

TOP SECRET/NODIS/MARIGOLD ENCLOSURE

December 20, 1966

FOR: Mr. Walt Rostow
The White House

Enclosed herewith is a summary
of the TOP SECRET, NODIS/MARIGOLD
series. The summary is a highly
sensitive document.

John P. Walsh
John P. Walsh
Deputy Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Summary

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A CHRONOLOGY

1. On June 29, 1966, D'Orlandi, the Italian Ambassador in Saigon, informed Ambassador Lodge that on June 27, Lewandowski, the Polish ICC representative, had come to him with a "very specific peace offer" (Saigon's 5840, June 29). The Italian Ambassador had been instructed by Foreign Minister Fanfani to submit the proposal to Lodge, simultaneously with a direct Italian approach in Washington.

D'Orlandi said Lewandowski had told him that Hanoi was prepared on a highly secret basis to seek a "political compromise" settling once and for all the entire Viet-Nam question. According to Lewandowski, Hanoi's proposal for a settlement included: (a) the NLF should "take part" in the negotiations; (b) the bombing should be suspended. In addition, Hanoi had indicated: (a) they would not ask for immediate reunification of north and south; (b) they will not ask for the establishment of a "socialist" system; (c) they will not ask for neutralization; (d) they are prepared to discuss a "reasonable calendar" for U.S. withdrawal; (e) although they would like someone other than Ky, they do not want to interfere with the SVG.

Lewandowski did not identify his Hanoi contact.

2. On the following day, Ambassador Lodge forwarded his personal views on the Polish "proposal". He felt the Hanoi package was so forthcoming as to arouse suspicion of the credibility of the Polish intermediary. He was convinced that the Poles would not have made the approach without specific Moscow approval. He emphasized his conviction that total secrecy is indispensable. The slightest mention of this development would cause its immediate abandonment (Saigon's 5855, June 30).

3. The Secretary responded to this message from Canberra (Canberra's Secto 58, June 30), noting that there might be something in the Polish approach, although the so-called "proposals" were neither clear nor particularly helpful. He felt that we should respond expeditiously to D'Orlandi and with careful instructions and reasonable precautions we should be able to minimize the inherent risks involved.

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4. On June 29, Italian Ambassador Fenoaltea, accompanied by Italian Ambassador-designate to Canada, Faroche, called on George Ball and Alexis Johnson to present the Fanfani message (State's 4108 to Saigon). Ball and Johnson told the Italians their message was similar to traditional Hanoi statements with the exception of: (a) the use of the word "participate" in respect to the NLF instead of "sole representative of SVN" and "suspension" instead of "cessation" of bombing. The Italian Government was asked on its own responsibility to query Lewandowski to determine whether these terms were used advisedly or were accidents of translation. On receipt of their response we would be in a better position to reply substantively to these overtures.

5. On July 1, D'Orlandi told Lodge that he had been queried by his Government about the meaning of the two words "participation" and "suspension" (Saigon's 131, July 2). Lewandowski had confirmed his understanding that these words meant, respectively, that the so-called NLF would not be the sole representative, and that what was desired was a suspension of bombing, meaning stopping temporarily without any commitments concerning resumption.

D'Orlandi found Lewandowski more eager than ever. Lewandowski said he was sure this was the right time to score against the Chinese. He stressed that the heart of the matter was a political settlement, and not whether the NLF was the sole representative or whether they meant suspension or cessation. He warned that any initiative from the UN or the ICC at this time would be "most unfortunate". He was sure that such initiatives would result in Peking putting pressure on Hanoi for immediate rejection, and this would jeopardize the current peace maneuver.

6. On July 5, Italian Ambassador Fenoaltea and Ambassador-designate Faroche again called on Messrs. Ball and Johnson and repeated the message passed to Lodge by D'Orlandi. Ball told them that we would be in touch with them in a day or two (Memcon, July 5, 1966).

On the same day, Acting Secretary Ball notified the Secretary (State 1773 to Kyoto) that Secretary McNamara and Walt Rostow would on July 6 request the President's authorization for the following course of action:

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- A. (1) Tell the Italian Ambassador that we are interested in the Lewandowski approach but there are obviously aspects that require verification;
- (2) Suggest that D'Orlandi seek discreetly to arrange a meeting between himself, Lewandowski and Lodge.
- B. Instruct Ambassador Lodge at such a meeting to:
 - (1) State that the US shares the desire for an over-all political settlement;
 - (2) Inquire when, where, and with what parties Hanoi contemplates that negotiations would take place;
 - (3) Inquire what if any action Hanoi would propose to take or not to take during the period of suspension of bombing (an implied reference to infiltration);
 - (4) Inquire whether Hanoi believes it realistic to keep negotiations secret if the US suspends bombing with the inevitable speculation this would entail.

7. The Secretary approved this course of action in a message to the Acting Secretary (SECTO 113, July 6).

8. On July 6, Arthur Goldberg sent an EXDIS message from Geneva (No. 61) discussing the Lewandowski approach in some detail. His information had been obtained from U Thant who, in turn, had obtained it from Fanfani.

9. On the same day, in an effort to establish more precise security control over the Italian-Polish approach, we notified Saig that all messages in this series would be slugged MARIGOLD.

10. On July 7, the Secretary was informed that the President had approved the script and Lodge had been appropriately instructed (State 2673 to Tokyo and 2626 to Saigon. The Acting

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Secretary told him that we feel that there may be an outside chance that, carefully nurtured, the Lewandowski approach might develop into something.

11. On the same day we confirmed to Goldberg that we had received a report from the Italians along the lines indicated by Fanfani to U Thant

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12. On July 9, Lewandowski, Lodge and D'Orlandi met in the latter's office (Saigon's 604). Lodge enumerated the four points cited above (para. 6) with Lewandowski taking careful notes and subsequently interrogating Lodge about their meaning. Finally, Lewandowski indicated that he would endeavor to obtain an answer from Hanoi as soon as possible.

13. When Goldberg saw Saragat in Rome on July 8, the latter reviewed developments in the Marigold series to that point and gave a detailed memorandum on the subject to Ambassador Reinhardt (Rome's 145, July 9).

14. On July 10, pursuant to State's 2626 of July 7, Lodge, in passing, told Ky that we had been getting some rumors out of Hanoi indicating a desire to find a way out. None of these seemed to have any real substance, but we would follow all of them up and, if anything important occurred, we would of course, tell him at once. Ky smiled, nodded, and said he was sure NVN could not stand much more of what they were getting (Saigon's 642, July 10).

15. On July 16, Polish Director General Michalowski told Ambassador Gronouski that Lodge had made a request to the Polish ICC member which the Poles are carrying out. He asked Gronouski to keep the Lodge matter strictly confidential (Warsaw's 120, July 16).

16. On July 23, Lodge reported that there were still no developments. He had not thought it wise to make any inquiries. He believed that what got Lewandowski going in the first place was fear of the US. He did not want Lewandowski to think we were overly eager and thus give the impression to Hanoi via

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Warsaw that we were weakening. It seemed to Lodge that it was worth a good deal psychologically for them to have taken the initiative and for the US to be "playing it cool". The chances of getting peace, he concluded, are much greater if we maintain our maximum influence and appear strong (Saigon's 1695, July 23).

17. On July 24, Lewandowski, Lodge, and D'Orlandi met in the latter's office for twenty minutes. Lewandowski, under instructions, read a prepared statement:

- A. It is difficult to discuss any proposition during the current important escalation of war activities in the south and of the bombing in the north;
- B. To hold such discussions could be looked upon as a maneuver to force the DRV to negotiate under American conditions;
- C. We know the DRV will not give up the fight while the US pursues its present policy of military pressure;
- D. We have reasons to state that no proposition without the cessation of the bombing of the DRV will produce results;
- E. If the US desires a peaceful solution, it must recognize the four points proposed by the DRV and prove it in practice.

Lodge noted that no one of our three questions had been answered and that this was a backward step. We were being asked to give up a great deal and that Hanoi was not prepared to give up anything. Lewandowski said it is a question of who will be the first to start giving.

D'Orlandi and Lewandowski agreed that the stiffness of the reply reflected the "circumstances of the moment," namely, all of the rumors in the newspapers of peace talks. This surprised Lodge who would have assumed that it was based on our military activity.

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Lodge concluded that if the conversations are to be fruitful, they would be lengthy and we cannot expect decisive results until after our elections (Saigon's 1785, July 24).

18. After Lewandowski left, Lodge talked privately with D'Orlandi, who said he was going to Rome, returning about August 15. Lewandowski was going to Hanoi in the first week of August. D'Orlandi felt Lewandowski's instructions were coming from Warsaw, with Warsaw undoubtedly telling Hanoi what it is doing. On the other hand, he felt the original demarche had come as a result of one of Lewandowski's visits to Hanoi (Saigon's 1788, July 24).

19. On August 13, D'Orlandi again met with Lodge. He described the leak in the magazine Il Borhese (Rome's 693) describing the Saigon meetings, which had caused considerable consternation. Under instructions, he had met the Polish Ambassador, Wyrلمان (sic), in Rome who told him he was instructed to say the Saigon talks "must go on" and that Lewandowski had been instructed to meet D'Orlandi and Lodge about August 20. D'Orlandi urged that the three get back to the subject matter of the meeting of July 9 and for Lewandowski to get answers to what D'Orlandi called the "US three procedural questions" (Saigon's 3428, August 13).

20. On September 4, D'Orlandi informed Lodge that Lewandowski had returned from 16 days in Hanoi profoundly discouraged. His two closest contacts, Phan Van Dong and General Giap, were both away. His talk with Ho Chi Minh produced nothing of interest. There was absolutely no sign of a desire to stop the war.

When D'Orlandi told Lewandowski he had no intention of remaining in Saigon if there was to be no forward motion at all from Lewandowski's side, the latter pleaded with him not to leave.

D'Orlandi told Lodge he would be willing to remain to work with Lewandowski to try to develop a compromise formula which could then be submitted to Moscow or Washington. Lodge, in turn, asked the Department for its views on this suggestion. He felt some ideas and clarification could come out of it and we would not be committed to anything. On the other hand, he doubted that the Pole would be authorized to participate (Saigon's 5229, September 4).

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21. On September 6 we told Lodge that we shared his doubt that Lewandowski would be authorized to work with D'Orlandi to develop a compromise formula but we saw no objection to D'Orlandi pursuing this with the Pole if latter is so authorized. Since we would not wish to be responsible for turning-off the D'Orlandi-Lewandowski exercise, we suggested that Lodge give it encouragement as long as it seemed to continue to have any prospects. On the other hand, we suspected that our direct contacts with the Poles may turn out to be a more fruitful channel (State's 41695).

22. On September 8 D'Orlandi told Lodge that he had discussed with Lewandowski the proposition that they work up a compromise formula to submit to Washington and Moscow. Lewandowski, in response, had made three points: (a) he did not want the outcome to be to inform the US as to "just how far the North Vietnamese would give in"; (b) emphasis must be given to the US approaching the problem so as to concern SVN alone and not SVN as a "piece of a general Chinese puzzle"; and (c) the aim of the exercise should not be to reinforce the status quo but to get an over-all settlement as regards SVN. This, said D'Orlandi quoting Lewandowski, means "guarantees, etc.," and "not just de-escalation". For illustration, D'Orlandi said this could mean "elections", "a new government", "settlement with the Viet Cong".

Lewandowski went on to say that the purpose of his discussions with D'Orlandi would not be to inaugurate a "socialist regime in SVN; it would not be to get a cease-fire and still less a stand-still."

Lewandowski was sure something could be done. Hanoi, he said, looks at the situation through the distorted spectacles of the Viet Cong through whom they get all their information. "My job", he said, "is to explain to Hanoi that they have a wrong view."

D'Orlandi said he was sure of one thing: Lewandowski does not want the talks to stop. D'Orlandi surmises the Communists intend to state that there is no hope; for the record to break off all conversations; adopt an attitude of nothing doing; and then to have the "non-talks" with D'Orlandi described above.

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23. On September 12 we responded to Lodge's message, pointing out that we found Lewandowski's thinking very interesting but not very lucid (State's 44917 to Saigon). Lodge was requested to raise certain ambiguities with D'Orlandi for clarification by Lewandowski.

- A. Lewandowski's remark that the aim of the exercise should not be to "reinforce the status quo" was all right if he was talking about the present status quo in SVN. We could not, however, buy a discarding of the status quo ante, i.e., the 1954 and 1962 agreements. While we would not rule out consideration of revising these agreements, we could accept no changes until we had a clear picture of what was the total context of an understanding with the Communists.
- B. D'Orlandi could reassure Lewandowski that we are not thinking of SVN as a piece of a general Chinese puzzle. However, we are concerned about Lewandowski's statement that "the problem could be simple enough if limited to SVN". North Viet-Nam is inevitably involved if there is to be any lasting settlement in SVN. At the same time we must be careful not to accept the idea that NVN has a full right to sit in on the disposition of the internal political arrangements within SVN just because it has sent its regiments where they have no right to be.

Lodge was also told that we remain skeptical that Hanoi or Warsaw is likely to choose the Lewandowski-D'Orlandi channel for substantive negotiation. Furthermore, we will reach a point where we will not be able to be more concrete about our positions unless we have better evidence that Lewandowski is empowered to speak for Hanoi and the latter is prepared to go beyond standard positions. Nevertheless, we will consider whether there is something that could be given D'Orlandi for his "possible agreement formula" which could demonstrate our earnest desire to move forward and smoke out Hanoi's intentions. This might be a mutually-timed withdrawal formula or quid pro quo on cessation of bombing and halt in expansion of US forces against an end to infiltration by Hanoi.

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24. On September 24, Lodge raised these points with D'Orlandi (Saigon's 5965) and obtained a number of clarifications: (a) the "status quo" refers to the political and governmental status quo in Saigon and has nothing to do with the 1954 and 1962 agreements. His side is not interested in ending military activities if the political and governmental situation in Saigon is thereby frozen. He wants a change of appearance, not a communist, socialist, or NLF Government in Saigon; (b) the statement that the "problem could be simple enough if limited to SVN" was in error. It should mean both North and South VN.

D'Orlandi was impressed that Lewandowski can go to Hanoi literally "whenever we want him to". He wants to test how influential Lewandowski is with Phan Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap. He is looking for "some little thing" which could be interpreted as an indication. He is sure Lewandowski speaks for Rapacki and with Moscow approval every inch of the way. He is inclined to believe that Lewandowski speaks for Pham Van Dong and Giap but would like to make sure. Since Lodge fully shared the Department's desire to obtain better evidence that Lewandowski is empowered to speak for Hanoi, he did not discourage D'Orlandi's idea of testing Lewandowski's relations with Dong and Giap.

When Lodge proffered the opinion that Hanoi would not be forthcoming until after our November elections, D'Orlandi disagreed. He felt that the internal upheaval in China, which had brought Peking close to diplomatic break with Moscow, was dominating official thinking in Hanoi, not our elections.

25. On September 24 we told Lodge that it might be useful to introduce the DMZ into the Marigold channel and see how much help Lewandowski could provide in clarifying Hanoi's intentions. One purpose would be to give Lewandowski a specific and concrete issue with Hanoi. A second, and more immediate objective, would be to get a better feel as to the seriousness of Hanoi's intentions about making the DMZ an effective buffer zone (State's 53825).

We are facing a dilemma of failing to take full advantage of a disposition on Hanoi's part to avoid a direct confrontation across the DMZ or, on the other hand, accepting disabilities with regard to our military action in that area which may be particularly dangerous if it develops that Hanoi's real intention is to launch an important offensive across the DMZ.

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If we are to ask Lewandowski to undertake this task we would contemplate authorizing him to indicate to Hanoi that we would be prepared to take some initial steps (holding off air strikes) to demonstrate our good faith in the matter. If Lodge thought well of this proposal, he was authorized to raise it with D'Orlandi and, if both concluded it had merit, to ask D'Orlandi to raise it with Lewandowski.

26. On September 18 Lodge reported that D'Orlandi and Lewandowski had met on the 16th (Saigon's 4767). In a rather disjointed discussion, Lewandowski shifted from a proposal of giving several GVN ministries to the NLF to espousing an ultimate objective of making "SVN a second Cambodia". He went on to express doubt that the Americans wanted to talk; they are trying, he said, to do two things at once: military escalation with political proposals. He opined that the Americans would not make up their minds before the November elections. D'Orlandi sensed from these disingenuous remarks that Lewandowski realizes that the only possible chance for significant talks is that our military success should grow.

27. On September 27, Lodge raised with D'Orlandi the idea of taking up the DMZ question with Lewandowski. D'Orlandi replied that Lewandowski would be strongly opposed to this proposition, since he had stuck his neck out against any barter such as "we stop doing this and you stop doing that". Furthermore, because of the DMZ terrain, Lewandowski believes that it is impossible for the ICC to supervise an arrangement such as we contemplated. Although opposed to this proposition, D'Orlandi reiterated his belief that Lewandowski should be put to the test soon (Saigon's 6990).

28. On September 29, D'Orlandi told Lodge that he thought "our channel may disappear". He thought Lewandowski would not remain in Saigon if he sees no sign that we are seriously interested in working through him (Saigon's 7230).

29. On the same day, the Secretary informed Lodge that he had told Rapacki in New York that he hoped Lewandowski would stay on for a period because some of the things which he said were interesting. Rapacki indicated he had no plans to withdraw him (State 56365). (While in New York at the General Assembly, the Secretary

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made a parallel approach to Fanfani about D'Orlandi. Subsequently, Fanfani asked Amb. Reinhardt to inform the Secretary that D'Orlandi would not be transferred (Rome's 1960, October 12).

30. On October 5, Lodge reported (Saigon's 7712) that D'Orlandi had told Lewandowski the previous day that he was going to tell Fanfani that there was no reason for him to remain in Saigon. Lewandowski had replied "you must not leave; there will be much to do after November 15."

31. On October 14, Lodge was instructed (State's 66655) to ask D'Orlandi to pass the following questions to Lewandowski: (a) Does his strong opposition against what he calls any form of "barter", i.e., we stop this--you stop that, reflect his own appraisal of Hanoi's position or is it based explicitly on what he has been told by the North Vietnamese? (b) Could he envisage any variation of Goldberg's bombing-infiltration formula which would be compatible with the principle of reasonable reciprocity and with Hanoi's apparent determination to avoid actions which could be interpreted as bowing to U.S. pressure? (c) Are there other elements which might be included in a formula which would cause Hanoi to give it serious consideration? (d) Why did he say there would be "much to do" after November 15?

32. On October 15, Lodge put these questions to D'Orlandi who answered as follows (Saigon's 8583, October 16):

- A. Lewandowski's views on the "barter question" reflect those of Dong and Giap;
- B. Lewandowski probably would not answer the questions about a variation of the bombing-infiltration formula or other elements to include in a formula because he wants an overall agreement--a "package deal" which covers everything and which thereby avoids any chance of publicity. Hanoi will buy something if it is "final".
- C. In respect to the significance of November 15, Lodge was certain that it was connected with Hanoi's views of our elections. One indication of this was Lewandowski's intent to go to Hanoi immediately after our elections. According to D'Orlandi, Lewandowski said when the electoral question is removed the US "can deal if it wants to".

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This confirmed Lodge's belief that Hanoi must at all costs avoid publicity and consequent loss of face. Lodge said he believed that long drawn out peace talks would be very dangerous for us. On the other hand, it now appears that Hanoi is convinced that long drawn out peace talks are utterly unacceptable for them.

33. On November 13 (State's 83786) we told Lodge we were not yet persuaded that Lewandowski is in a position to provide an effective line of communication. Therefore, his next meeting with Lewandowski should be devoted primarily to asking questions so that we can get a better feel for what he thinks can be accomplished through him. These queries were to be put to Lewandowski:

- A. What role does he envisage for himself;
- B. What does Hanoi consider to be his role;
- C. We understand he wants a "final" agreement and not merely truce discussions. How does he propose to get from "here to there";
- D. Could some package deal be worked out which in its totality represented what both we and Hanoi would agree to be a reasonable measure of mutual deescalation with two separate phases in its execution: Phase One - we stop bombing; Phase Two would see the execution of all the other agreed deescalatory actions. Hanoi's actions in Phase Two would appear to respond to our actions in Phase Two.

34. On November 14, Lodge, Lewandowski, and D'Orlandi met in the latter's apartment. Lewandowski said his comments were not "official" in the sense of instructions from Hanoi but he did wish to clear up some things before he left for Hanoi. He had four questions:

- A. Regarding the Manila troop withdrawal offer, does this mean the US withdrawal depends on control by the present GVN of territories not now under the control of Saigon?

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- B. In case of a cease fire, would the US be prepared to withdraw from the combat areas and not to interfere in the creation of a new government in SVN?
- C. In case of a cease fire, would the US undertake not to interfere in peaceful progress toward unification of Viet-Nam, whether by referendum or elections?
- D. In the case of a cease fire and negotiations, would the US be prepared to use the Geneva Agreement and the machinery of the ICC in bringing peace to Viet-Nam?

Having told him that his questions would be submitted to Washington, Lodge then asked the questions listed in paragraph 33. Lewandowski prefaced his response by saying that some of the questions could not be answered now. He described his present role as being in accord with the instructions of his Government which is prepared for him to take any role which would bring peace nearer. He said he was not an agent of Hanoi but, "if and when they decide they want you to know something, they would tell me." The third question as to how you get from "here to there" he regarded as a "frame without a picture"; it was very theoretical. The fourth question about two Phases was complicated but had possibilities. A "package deal", he said, is the only practical way of going at it--A through Z.

D'Orlandi thought the package deal idea was a "very substantial concession".

In parting, Lewandowski said "there should be no further escalation; to do so would freeze the atmosphere."

35. On November 14, Lodge was instructed to tell Lewandowski that he would be speaking in Hanoi for himself on the basis of his understanding of our position (State's 84238). If the Prime Minister asks him "what the Americans think, he should convey the idea that we (a) remain intent on finding a path to a reasonable and honorable settlement but we are not prepared to

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withdraw and find that armed subversive forces from the North have moved in again; (b) we are serious about our willingness to remove our troops, dismantle our bases, and to accept a non-aligned SVN; (c) as long as the northern elements are removed, we would not insist on public affirmation by Hanoi.

Lodge was also instructed to convey the following answers to Lewandowski's four questions:

- A. The Manila formulation on withdrawal was carefully drafted on the basis of specific indications from Eastern European sources that such a statement would help in establishing an acceptable basis for negotiations;
- B. We support free elections in SVN and will abide by the electoral wishes of the people;
- C. The question of the reunification of Viet-Nam should be determined by the Vietnamese of both North and South through their own free decision, without any interference from outside;
- D. The 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements are an adequate basis for peace in SEA. We would be prepared to discuss all matters relating to the complicated problem of an effective and truly neutral mechanism of supervision and control.

36. The three again met on November 15 and Lodge conveyed the views contained in paragraph 35 (Saigon's 10955). Lewandowski took careful notes and Lodge concluded that never before was his attitude so forthcoming, not to say eager. Lodge said he was beginning to wonder if the crux of the matter was not a face-saving package formula.

37. On December 1, Marigold went active (Saigon's 12247). When the three again met in D'Orlandi's apartment, D'Orlandi privately told Lodge that "something big had happened." D'Orlandi then opened the session by saying that Hanoi had made a specific point

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about leaks; if a leak occurs, Hanoi and the Polish Government will promptly deny that discussions have occurred. Lodge replied that we would leave no stone unturned to maintain secrecy.

Lewandowski emphasized that both Rapacki and Gomulka felt that what had been accomplished in the Saigon and Hanoi conversations "may be decisive". He went on to say that he had presented to Hanoi his understanding of the US position based on "our" conversations of November 14 and our previous conversations. He then outlined his comments as follow:

- A. The US is interested in a peaceful solution through negotiations;
- B. A political negotiation would be aimed at finding an acceptable solution to all the problems, having in mind that the present status quo in SVN must be changed in order to take into account the interests of the parties presently opposing the policy of the US in SVN;
- C. The US is not interested in having a permanent or long-term military presence in SVN once a peaceful solution is reached. This is the meaning of the Manila Communique on withdrawal and dismantling;
- D. The US would be ready to discuss a settlement covering all important points from a cease-fire to a final solution and withdrawal of US troops;
- E. Within a general solution, the US would not oppose the formation of a GVN based on the true will of the Vietnamese people with participation of all through free democratic elections;

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- F. The US believes the unification of Viet-Nam must be decided by the Vietnamese people in peaceful conditions;
- G. The US is ready to accept and respect a true and complete neutrality of SVN;
- H. The US is prepared to stop bombing of the North if this would facilitate a peaceful solution. This would not involve public confirmation by North Viet-Nam that its armed forces are or were infiltrating into SVN. (At this point Lewandowski cited the Phase One and Two formulation);
- I. I have informed the proper Governmental sources that, at the same time, the US would not agree to unification under military pressure;
- J. It would be unrealistic to expect that the US will declare now or in the future its acceptance of NVN's four or five points.

At the end of his itemization, he asked if this was a "correct statement of the US point of view". Lodge replied that what he had cited was in keeping with the spirit of our policy but a definitive reply would have to await Washington review. He noted, however, that clarification would be required of Points B and H.

Lewandowski said what he had just read was firmly based on conversations with Pham Van Dong who had the "Presidium behind him". Furthermore, it was vouched for by Rapacki and Moscow had been informed. He added that, if the US are of the views presented, it would be advisable to confirm them

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directly by conversation with the NVN Ambassador in Warsaw. He further emphasized that the US should stop the bombing of NVN "apart from all other things".

38. On the same day Lodge was advised that urgent consideration was being given to his report which was being very closely held (State's 94660).

39. On December 2, Lodge was instructed to tell Lewandowski that our Embassy in Warsaw would contact the DRV Ambassador on December 6. He will confirm that the ten points broadly represent our position but that several specific points are subject to important differences of interpretation (State's 95709).

40. On the same day, Ambassador Gronouski in Warsaw was informed of Lewandowski's actions and his suggestion that we confirm his Hanoi statement directly to the NVN Ambassador in Warsaw. He was told that, if talks took place in Warsaw, he would guide them (State's 95711).

41. On December 3, Lodge carried out the instructions cited para 39 in a meeting with Lewandowski and D'Orlandi. Lewandowski said he assumed from Lodge's statement that some of the ten paragraphs needed clarification which would occur in Warsaw. He also said that his Foreign Ministry would establish the first contact between the NVN Ambassador and the American representative.

He went on to say that he had been instructed by Rapacki to express concern about the bombing of Hanoi the previous day. Lodge replied that this event had occurred for military reasons and had nothing to do with what the three were working on (Saigon's 12428).

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42. As MARIGOLD entered a new phase, Lodge on December 4 submitted certain observations on the rationale and objectives of Hanoi (Saigon's 12399). He believes the changing attitude in the North reflects their belief that we are sure to win and their alarm at Viet-Nam's advance to constitutional democracy. He believes they always had in the back of their minds that, if the military situation went sour, they could always turn to politics and try to take the government from within. This is the inherent danger in paragraph two of Lewandowski's formulation; i.e., the "present status quo in SVN must be changed to take into account the interests of the parties presently opposing the policy of the US in SVN." If this means putting the NLF into the GVN, it is impossible, since it would in effect give official benediction to the vast criminal terrorist element which is at the bottom of the whole war. On the other hand, the present status quo will be changed by the elections which are to be held under the new constitution; perhaps the Viet Cong can be candidates in these elections, although Lodge was not sanguine about GVN agreement to this.

Lodge wondered if the Viet Cong were stepping up terrorism, particularly in the Saigon area, to get another chip in the Marigold game. He was also concerned about the absence of consultation with the GVN about this entire matter.

Lodge concluded that we have gotten to the current point in the MARIGOLD business by "playing it cool" and we should stick to this approach. Eagerness tends to harden communist positions to a degree we cannot accept--and this lengthens the war.

43. On December 5, Rapacki called Amb. Gronouski in (Warsaw's 1363). He opened by saying that the Poles are again trying to play a constructive role in ending the Viet-Nam war and he

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hoped this attempt will succeed. He then recounted the two November meetings of Lodge and Lewandowski, as well as the December 1 meeting when Lodge allegedly confirmed Lewandowski's resume of our position. At a fourth meeting on December 3, Lodge had told Lewandowski (a) the US Embassy would contact the DRV Ambassador in Warsaw on December 6; (b) the US Embassy would confirm to him that the Lewandowski December 1 resume broadly reflects the position of the USG; and (c) several specific points are subject to important differences of interpretation.

Rapacki expressed great concern about the effect of the interpretation question on the contact with the DRV Ambassador and how this equivocation will be read by Hanoi, particularly in view of the intensification of bombing. He then asked what can be the position of Poland in its role as intermediary if after all the conversations which were held and statements made there still remains this doubt. He suggested that Lodge's point three be deleted. He said, if he transmitted the Lodge statement to Hanoi, the most favorable response would be a reexamination of the whole matter by Hanoi. The Warsaw contact would have to be postponed. He said he was holding up the transmission in hopes of obtaining an improved version. He asked that his deep concern in this respect be conveyed to the President.

44. On December 6, Lewandowski called a meeting at D'Orlandi's apartment on the basis of an instruction from Rapacki. His instruction emphasized that our reference to (para. 43) differences of interpretation raised a question about the whole position embodied in the ten paragraphs which were to form the platform for the Warsaw meeting (Saigon's 12601). Lewandowski stated that the first contact with the DRV is of extreme importance and every effort must be made not to kill it before it is started, particularly since the "overture of the Warsaw contact was shadowed by the bombing of Hanoi". Rapacki had instructed him to say that

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he is obliged to convey the US statement as it stands if nothing can be done but he would like to convey simultaneously some clarification concerning the points which are subject to "important differences of interpretation".

Lodge then paraphrased his basic instruction (State 97016), emphasizing that we have gone quite far in stating our position without anything directly or indirectly from the other side other than the repetition of their four points. He stated that Lewandowski's statement to him had been oral, and presumably was the same in Hanoi, and subject to the imprecision of multiple translation. Furthermore, these matters of great importance were discussed in general terms. Therefore, we might expose ourselves to charges of bad faith in any subsequent negotiations if we did not make clear that there is a wide latitude for interpretation of your general formulation.

Lodge added that "your formulation broadly reflects the position of the USG on the issues covered and we would be prepared to accept it as the basis for direct discussions with the DRV if they are in fact interested in pursuing the matter, and if they are informed that latitude for interpretation of such general language is inevitable."

D'Orlandi then said it was obviously a technical misunderstanding, a question of method. Lodge, he said, wants to avoid misunderstanding. Turning to Lewandowski, he said "the US has stuck its neck out. It is not very fair to ask for a second statement by the US." Lewandowski responded "it is not true that Hanoi has given nothing. To agree to meet an American in a secret way is quite a lot."

Lodge concluded that the Polish objection to our stating that there are differences in interpretation is picayune.

45. On December 5 (State's 97016), Gronouski was instructed to tell Rapacki we have gone quite far without anything directly or indirectly from Hanoi other than the monotonous repetition of their four points. While pointing out the imprecisions inherent in the Lewandowski presentation, Gronouski was to tell Rapacki that Lewandowski's formulation broadly reflects the position of the USG on the issues covered and we would be prepared to accept it as the basis for direct discussions with

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the North Vietnamese if they are in fact interested in pursuing the matter, and if they are informed that latitude for interpretation of such general language is inevitable.

46. Gronouski carried out his instructions on December 6 in a meeting with Rapacki (Warsaw's 1375). The latter took umbrage at our comments about the lack of response from Hanoi. While the US had not received a response on substance, it had received a response on procedures which Rapacki regarded as a step forward by Hanoi. Rapacki said he must reserve judgment whether the USG had actually made a step forward. The qualifications made by Lodge on December 3 raised doubts on this score. Turning to the subject of the first meeting with the DRV Ambassador, he said the NVN Government would expect to receive the precise and official position of the USG and he assumed, with a smile, that it will not be different than the one presented to Lewandowski.

47. At a reception later that evening, Director General Michalowski told Gronouski that the Poles would do everything possible to bring about Warsaw negotiations between the USG and NVN and to make them successful (Warsaw's 1376). He said Rapacki had conveyed the USG position to Hanoi shortly after Gronouski's meeting with him on December 6. Michalowski grumbled about the bombing and underscored Rapacki's insistence that at the first meeting with the DRV Ambassador in Warsaw we do more than confirm, with qualification, Lewandowski's resume of Lodge's ten points. The DRV is not interested in what Lewandowski said, but rather in hearing the USG position directly from us.

48. On December 7, Gronouski was given an interim response to his 1375, which had indicated the DRV Ambassador would expect a definitive statement of our position at the first meeting (State's 97930). In the unlikely event that an early meeting occurred, Gronouski was given interim instructions to follow his previous instructions. In addition, he was authorized to read the Lewandowski statement and to inquire whether this was the same as the statement made in Hanoi.

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49. On the same day, Rapacki again called in Gronouski (Warsaw's 1394). Rapacki opened with the statement that the misgivings, warnings of which he had informed us, are materializing. The "interpretation clause", coinciding with the intensified bombing, had been understood accordingly. He said Poland could not continue in its role unless it is convinced that we have or will put an end to this intensified bombing. If Poland is satisfied on this score, and if a contact occurs in Warsaw, it will be necessary for the USG to recapitulate its whole position to the NVN Representative with sufficient clarity to avoid the fear of the other side that we would subsequently change our position through recourse to Lodge's "important differences of interpretation" clause. In response to Gronouski's question, Rapacki said he was expressing the Polish position, and only that of the Poles.

50. On December 7, additional instructions (State's 98754) were sent to Gronouski in respect to his presentation to the North Vietnamese representative. In essence, he was to tell the Ambassador (a) we are prepared to enter into direct discussions on the basis of the position which Lewandowski has informed us he presented in Hanoi; (b) (After reading the Ten Points of Lewandowski) the language is that of Lewandowski and not of the US. Nevertheless, it represents a general statement of the US position on which we would be prepared to enter into direct discussions (Gronouski was told on an FYI basis that we do not wish to state our position in our own words because (1) we would have to take a harder position than Lewandowski and (2) a direct formulation might be used to embarrass us with the GVN)); (c) some matters because of their complexity would be the subject of further elaboration by us (point 8 on Phase One and Two and Points 2 and 5); (d) we are prepared to enter into secret negotiations at any time.

Gronouski was authorized to tell the Poles, if asked, that we are prepared to confirm to the North Vietnamese Government the position of the US with respect to negotiations in terms which will be consistent with the discussions which Lewandowski had with them and us.

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51. On December 9 (Saigon's 12953), D'Orlandi met with the Secretary and Lodge. He said Lewandowski had called on him the previous evening to express grave concern over the bombing attacks on the Hanoi area December 2 and 4. He urged D'Orlandi to tell the Secretary these attacks could only threaten or destroy the possibility of contact in Warsaw. D'Orlandi told Lewandowski that no contact had taken place because of apparent refusal of Rapacki to convey a firm message; therefore, it was not fair to say that the possibility of contact was destroyed by the US. He went on to say that Fanfani had received a strong demarche protesting the US bombing action and reservations of interpretation. Fanfani asked for the Secretary's views, while assuring him that he had called Rapacki urging him to go ahead and arrange the contact. D'Orlandi surmised that Rapacki had "tried to be clever" and to get the US to withdraw all reservations before the contact was made.

The Secretary suggested that D'Orlandi tell Fanfani that (a) v are in direct touch with Rapacki on the points raised; and (b) the bombing could be the first topic in discussions.

52. On December 8, Gronouski was instructed to speak firmly to Rapacki on the bombing issue, emphasizing that the pattern of bombing has nothing to do with the current efforts of the Polish and US Governments to get underway the projected US-NVN talks (State's 98924). The pattern of bombing is dictated by military considerations and is subject to the vagaries of weather. The subject of bombing was discussed with Lewandowski and we are prepared to pursue the subject with the North Vietnamese. Inherent in the (pt 8) package formulation is an approach to deescalation.

Gronouski was further instructed that, if Rapacki attempts to nail us to anything on the bombing beyond our first contact with the North Vietnamese, or again threatens to break off the operation, he was to inform him in no uncertain terms that if he maintains that position he will have to accept the full responsibility for the breakdown of what appears to us to be a promising possibility for peace.

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53. On December 9, Gronouski called on Rapacki and told him that he was prepared to confirm to the NVN Government our position in respect to negotiations in terms consistent with those used by Lewandowski with them and with us (Warsaw's 1421). He then outlined our views on the bombing question as outlined in para 52, except for pinning the responsibility for a breakdown in the negotiations on Rapacki since there was no threat of breaking off the talks.

Rapacki responded that there appeared to be no advance on the "reservation" and "bombing" points. However, if our presentation should dispel doubt on invoking the interpretation clause, one of the difficulties would have been reduced. On the bombing question, there was nothing new in our argument and he is loathe to transmit to Hanoi our interpretation that we are carrying on military business as usual and abstracting it from any political consideration. Turning to the question of "important differences of interpretation," he said if this merely meant hammering out greater precision in negotiations he could perfectly well understand what we were getting at but if this is the case, why did we mention it at all.

Rapacki concluded by saying that it is not easy to arrange the first meeting and we would have to wait and see what happens. However, it "looked as if we could move forward" (Warsaw's 1422, December 10).

54. On December 10, Lodge reported on a number of Viet-Cong terrorist actions, including an attempt to blow up the very building in which the Marigold talks were occurring. This took place at the same time that the Poles were complaining about the US bombing (Saigon's 13059).

55. On the same day, Gronouski was complimented on his handling of the negotiations. He was told that we surmised that Rapacki's involved argumentation and accusations were aimed at getting us to withdraw all reservations and to state unequivocally that our position is precisely as Lewandowski told Lodge he had transmitted it to Hanoi. Gronouski was also advised that the present bombing pattern has been authorized for some time and we do not wish to withdraw this authorization at this time (State's 100627).

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56. On December 11, Gronouski was provided background information on our bombing, as well as the latest run down on VC terrorist acts in SVN (State's 100700).

57. On December 13, Rapacki informed Gronouski that the Poles have informed the North Vietnamese Government that "our conversations took place, and have transmitted those parts destined for transmittal". (Warsaw's 1458) Recapping the situation, Rapacki said the events of November had made him hopeful that meetings could be held. However, in December, new elements appeared on the scene which were negatively assessed in Hanoi. Not surprisingly, therefore, with this new situation and considering the US reaction to the Polish concern, there was a reappraisal by the party most directly involved. As a result, we are faced with a postponement of the Warsaw meetings.

In describing the Polish role, he said "we have our own views and we are friends of Hanoi, but our role is neither that of postman or advocate; what we want is peace".

We should realize that the North Vietnamese Government cannot yield under pressure. To do so would be interpreted as a sign of weakness and be utilized by those who have a different vision of this peace move than exists in Warsaw.

Responding to Gronouski's rebuttal, Rapacki said he did not wish to suggest that there had been an armistice and he realized the war was still going on. However, we should realize that bombing of NVN is the really sensitive point.

58. Responding to the Secretary's inquiry from Paris (Paris' 9077), we told him on December 14 that we did not interpret Rapacki's statement as a negative reply from Hanoi in effect closing the Marigold door (State's 102298). Firm instructions were being sent Gronouski designed to keep the dialogue going, while at the same time making a clear record of the legitimacy of our participation in the Marigold effort from its inception.

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59. On the same day, Rapacki summoned Gronouski (Warsaw's 1471, December 15). He said the US had to be conscious of and realize the importance of establishing direct contact with Hanoi. We received "more than a signal; we received a direct, positive response about the possibility of talks in Warsaw." Immediately, thereafter, the US reserved the possibility of modifying its attitude and entered a new stage of escalation. On six occasions in Warsaw and Saigon, the US was "warned...of the consequences of their actions." On December 13, the US Air Force raided Hanoi. "This was the last drop that spilled over the cup." He said "we understand and fully share the wish of the DRV, which was transmitted to us today, that we terminate all conversations begun months ago in Saigon. The Polish Government states that the whole responsibility for losing this chance of a peaceful solution to the Viet-Nam war rests on the USG.... Once again it becomes clear how difficult it is to believe in your words."

Gronouski made no rebuttal. He concluded that we have no choice but to take immediate action to try to get the discussions back on the track. This would require, in his judgment, an assurance to the Poles that we will not create an impression of bombing intensification in NVN and that we do not intend to bomb in the immediate vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong during this period. We should express our deep desire for the initiation of the talks and ask the Poles to continue their efforts. The alternative is to lose an opportunity for initiating negotiations and also to do serious damage to the credibility of our stated objectives.

60. Gronouski's cable in the previous paragraph crossed a basic instruction (State's 102960, December 14) to him. Finding Rapacki's tactics and comments discouraging in terms of early talks with the DRV, the following two objectives were to be hued to in further conversations with the Poles: (a) we mean to keep the door open as long as there seems to be any possibility of getting talks started while sticking to our position as generally represented by Lewandowski's Ten Points; and (b) we sincerely want to begin substantive talks and the record should clearly show our persistent efforts to move forward. The Polish contention that our actions and statements have thrown roadblocks in the way of Warsaw talks is to be thoroughly refuted.

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Gronouski was instructed to seek a meeting with Rapacki and to present him with a full statement of our position consisting of

- A. The history of the Lodge-D'Orlandi-Lewandowski conversations in which we frankly outlined our position with regard to negotiations, bombing suspension and other forms of de-escalation, and terms of settlement; Lodge's confirmation on December 1 of Lewandowski's formulation as representing our position, subject of course to interpretation, which in Rapacki's terms, meant merely hammering out greater precision in negotiations; Lewandowski's proposal and Lodge's acceptance to meet DRV representatives in Warsaw.
- B. During and after all this was taking place, the war had continued, including the bombing of the north, the infiltration of the South, and VC terror. In the Saigon conversations this continuing waging of the war was not related to the efforts to get underway talks for a peaceful settlement. Actually, our package proposal with Phases One and Two was designed to facilitate a process of de-escalation as soon as possible after the Warsaw talks began.
- C. As soon as we began to talk with the Polish Government in Warsaw, new terms and conditions were put forward with the opening of direct talks contingent on our filling them.
- D. We remain confused as to what Hanoi has said and what represents the views of the Polish Government. The issues that stand between us and a peaceful settlement are exceedingly complicated and we despair of progress being made until the way is open for an exchange of views rather than a unilateral declaration from our side.

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E. Nevertheless, we want to leave no stone unturned in our search for peace. We are prepared to start at either end of a total agreement; i.e., to discuss de-escalation through a two-phase arrangement or to proceed to discussions of a total agreement including de-escalation as a final item.

F. Finally, Rapacki was to be told that, if he threatens to break off the operation, he will have to accept full responsibility for the breakdown of what appears to be a promising possibility for peace.

61. Gronouski took issue with these instructions on December 15 (Warsaw's 1475), maintaining that the current situation requires us to give the assurances cited in his 1471.

62. Following a review with the President of Gronouski's recommendations, additional instructions were sent to him on December 15 (State's 103342). He was informed that the discouraging line taken by Rapacki in their last meeting did not alter our basic assessment contained in paragraph 60. Rapacki seems to be pushing the most lurid press reports to the hilt in his tactic of getting maximum concessions out of us. We continue to be uncertain about the degree of Hanoi involvement in the Warsaw scenario of recent weeks. With some additional argumentation provided, Gronouski was requested to seek an early meeting with Rapacki. He was to emphasize that we had been waiting for two weeks to get the talks started, while Rapacki introduced new conditions. He was to express concern over the gravity of the Polish actions which serve the interests of neither the US nor the DRV. He was to emphasize that there has been neither escalation on our part (State's 103586, December 15, provided considerable information on our bombing policies and recent strikes) or de-escalation of VC terror (State's 103488, December 15, provided a resume of terrorist activity). With respect to Rapacki's slur on the credibility of our word, he was instructed to tell the Minister that regretfully we are reaching the conclusion that the Polish Government is seeking to make a case which is based on false premises and does not

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relate to the facts. This gives us double concern because of its effect on peace prospects and on our bilateral relations with the Polish Government. Finally, and in spite of the fact that Rapacki's line makes it essential that he get the full force of our rejection of his arguments and our indignation at the Polish Government's changing the signals and then seeking to put the blame on us, we felt that Gronouski should leave no doubt in the mind of Rapacki about our continuing strong desire to move forward in direct conversations with the North Vietnamese.

Gronouski was advised that Rapacki's last presentation probably brings us to the crisis phase in our current efforts. The best chance of securing a favorable resolution, namely Hanoi's willingness to begin talks on the basis worked out with Lewandowski, would occur if we maintained and strongly defended our position, rebutting and rejecting the line which Rapacki is trying to sell.

63. Before receiving this instruction, Gronouski reported (Warsaw's 1487, December 15) that the official Polish press agency had issued a harsh Polish Government denunciation of the "further brutal escalation of aggressive steps of American imperialism." This strengthened his conviction that we should provide assurances to Rapacki that we would restrain our bombing activities and, evidently, drop our interpretive reservations.

64. On December 16, Gronouski reported that Rapacki was out of town and he would not see him until December 19. With particular references to the key operative paragraphs (8 and 9) of State's 103342, he said he would "present our case with force and conviction" (Warsaw's 1498).

65. Late on December 15, the Acting Secretary suggested to the Secretary, who was in Paris, that he consider discussing the Marigold situation with Fanfani. This was predicated on the assumption that Fanfani would appreciate such a report from the Secretary and might be able to help out with the Poles (State's 103576 to Paris). The Secretary subsequently implemented this suggestion and Fanfani said he would see what he could do.

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66. On December 17, [REDACTED] Saigon was queried by the Netherlands Charge about a statement by Lewandowski concerning negotiations with Hanoi. Lewandowski told the Charge he was bitter because the efforts of his "group" to negotiate with Hanoi on the subject of peace talks were blocked by the recent American bombing of Hanoi. He said he was so bitter that he planned to write a "paper" on the subject (Saigon's 13640). This was the second report connecting Lewandowski with negotiating on our behalf with Hanoi (Saigon's 12392, December 4, 1966). Ambassador Porter noted that the loose-tongued performance of Lewandowski contrasted badly with his oft-repeated statements about the need for secrecy.

67. On December 17, the Department replied to Porter, stating that Lewandowski's indiscretions are most unfortunate and potentially harmful to the Warsaw talks. Porter was instructed to ask D'Orlandi to tell Lewandowski that we are carrying forward the Warsaw talks in good faith and we want him to live up to his oft-repeated pleas for secrecy (State's 104673). Porter was also told that he should be prepared to discuss the Marigold effort with Ky if the story leaks out. While we preferred that he consult with us before taking this step, he was given contingent authority to proceed forthwith if he judged that there was not sufficient time to consult. He was to tell Ky we get many apparent leads on the subject of a peaceful settlement. We do not overlook any lead which appears promising. While most of these leads dissipate immediately, some are pursued further. The Lewandowski contact has been in this category. Ky may be assured that if any lead offers any real prospect of consultation with Hanoi, he will be promptly consulted.

68. On December 18, Habib conveyed to D'Orlandi the substance of Lewandowski's indiscreet remarks to the Dutch Charge (Saigon's 13618). D'Orlandi then summarized a long, bitter statement made by Lewandowski to him the previous afternoon. The highlights were that the NVN Government had sent a "note" to Rapacki on December 15 indicating that, under the circumstances and in view of the cynical attitude of the US, they considered the thing had broken down and there was no point in going on. Lewandowski felt his position was so badly damaged with the North Vietnamese that he would have to leave Viet-Nam. D'Orlandi told him that, if that is true, he might as well leave too.

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After expressing his personal concern about the December 14 bombing, D'Orlandi said he would do his best to explain the situation to Lewandowski and to calm him down. He felt, however, that the most effective way to shut-up Lewandowski was by getting to Rapacki.

Porter said that he had always wondered what would induce the NVN to accept a Polish role in this most delicate business, and we have nothing but Polish assertions that they did. He felt that Lewandowski's present reactions resemble those of a thwarted gambler who expected to make a profit playing with other people's money.

69. In a FLASH message on December 19, just prior to his meeting with Rapacki, Gronouski requested authorization to suggest to Rapacki (a) that these negotiations create delicate problems for us with other principals in this conflict who are not inclined to go nearly as far as the USG to initiate peace negotiations and (b) that an extension of the cease-fire through Tet would offer a propitious time for direct Warsaw discussions (Warsaw's 1506). While each proposal was troublesome, Gronouski was given a FLASH authorization to make passing reference to point (a) while avoiding any implication that we were qualifying or backing away from what we had already said. In respect to point (b) Gronouski's attention was called to the section of his basic instructions concerning the possibility of phased de-escalation which could relate to the holiday period. In putting this forward, he was authorized to ask Rapacki if there were any other courses of action to be taken by both sides which would be useful (State's 104776).

70. Before departing for his meeting on December 19 with Rapacki, Gronouski transmitted (Warsaw's 1508) an advance text of his oral presentation to Rapacki, as derived from State's 102960, 103342, 103586 and 83786, including the following paragraphs:

"12. We have been waiting now in Warsaw for almost two weeks to get started on discussions, and your Govt must bear the responsibility for the fact

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that these have yet to get underway. You well know that one important subject for such discussions would be to arrange for mutual de-escalation, including bombing of NVN. You also know that in all of the discussions leading up to the Polish proposal and our agreement to meet with the NVN in Warsaw, there was no condition relating to bombing. All of the increasingly indignant charges we have heard here, including the threat to terminate the conversations, are based on events subsequent to the agreement reached with the Polish Govt on Dec. 3, events which are extraneous to what was the basis of our agreement at that time.

- "13. We are deeply concerned over the gravity of Polish actions which serve the basic, long-run interests of neither of the parties whom you say you mean to be helping. We regretfully find ourselves being led to the conclusion that the Polish Govt., whether on its own or in response to promptings from the NVN Govt, is seeking to make a case which is based on false premises and does not relate to the facts as we know them. This gives us concern not only because of the damaging effect it could have on prospects for working out a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam but because we would find it difficult not to have our attitude about our relations with the Polish Govt also affected."

When Gronouski finished reading the first sentence of Para. 12, Rapacki banged his fist on the table and in great agitation said he would "hear no more of this". In an angry tone, he said he categorically rejected this attempt to shift responsibility to the Poles, that responsibility is squarely on us for destroying the chance for peace talks, and that our attempt to shift responsibility is wholly unprecedented and unwarranted.

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Given Rapacki's reaction, Gronouski did not convey to him the remaining sections of para. 12 and 13 cited above. In the course of a lengthy harangue following the completion of Gronouski's formal statement, Rapacki said "your whole presentation today cannot be described except as confirmation of fears that the USG has decided to withdraw from the attitude expressed by Lodge, has chosen a brutal way to do this, and is now trying to twist the facts and shift responsibility to Poland. I reject categorically," he said, "as outright cynical the statement on Poland's being responsible for postponement of the Warsaw meetings. The Warsaw meetings were bombed by the US."

In response to Gronouski's request that he help get the talks started, Rapacki said "I suspect that if we did approach Hanoi their response would be that the USG has proposed nothing new which would overcome the reasons why Hanoi asked for discontinuation of talks in the first place."

At the end of the meeting, Gronouski reported that Rapacki, who had mellowed a bit, said "if we convey to Hanoi everything you told us today, we would destroy any possibility of their engaging in negotiations." Gronouski concluded his report with the observation that Rapacki did not say the Poles would take any further action; neither, however, did he say that they would not.

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71. On December 20 Gronouski was informed that we consider this to be a logical time to review MARIGOLD with him and to plan ahead. Therefore, we wished him to return to Washington for consultations at the earliest feasible time (State's 10509). /Gronouski arrived in Washington on the evening of December 22 and departed the following evening.7

72. Gronouski responded on December 21 (Warsaw's 1529) stating that he would depart for Washington the following morning. He intended to see Rapacki prior to his departure to inform him that he was returning for consultations on the Viet-Nam question under a public cover of consulting on U.S. economic questions with Poland and Eastern Europe. He would also request an explicit statement by Rapacki on what the NVN officials have said to the Poles during Lewandowski's visit to Hanoi and since discussions started in Warsaw.

73. After explaining to Rapacki the rationale for his trip to Washington, Gronouski asked him to clarify the role that Hanoi played in the MARIGOLD discussions (Warsaw's 1535, December 21). Rapacki replied that the messages Lewandowski gave to Lodge upon his return from Hanoi expressing NVN's positive response to talks in Warsaw, Rapacki's warning after the December 3 bombing that Hanoi would have to reassess the situation, and the decision to terminate discussions in Warsaw were all decisions by NVN which were conveyed to us by the Poles. He also said that during the Warsaw discussions there were a number of other exchanges between Warsaw and Hanoi, adding that the Poles are confident that what they expressed on their own initiative accurately reflected Hanoi's opinion.

Rapacki then said, in reference to our accusation that the Poles have raised new conditions since the talks shifted to Warsaw, that interpretation clause question was raised by Lewandowski immediately upon hearing it expressed by Lodge on December 3. He also observed that the critical problem of bringing Hanoi to the conference table involves the question of pressure: Hanoi could never respond to pressure. This, he said, is the reason why the bombing issue is so important. What is needed now, he added, is to restore the degree of confidence in U.S. intentions that existed in Hanoi at the time Lewandowski was there.

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74. Prior to his departure, Gronouski was instructed to convey a substantive message to Rapacki (State's 106358). In sum, Gronouski was instructed to make the following points: (1) Our investigation of the alleged bombing of Hanoi has been thorough. The targets were 5 miles from the center of the city. Any U.S. ordnance that may have fallen within the city limits was accidental; (2) nonetheless we are prepared to state there will be no bombing within ten miles of the city center for an indefinite period if talks with the N. Vietnamese can begin shortly; (3) appropriate reciprocal action with respect to bombs, mortar and similar terrorist activities within ten miles of the center of Saigon would be anticipated by us as evidence of good faith; (4) Gronouski would be empowered to conduct full negotiations in accordance with prior Lewandowski talks at any time in Warsaw. However, if the North Vietnamese prefer, we would be willing to send Goldberg to Warsaw or any third country with full powers to conduct similar negotiations, secretly or openly, as they prefer.

75. Gronouski met Rapacki at 0100, December 22 (Warsaw's 1537) and Rapacki responded unenthusiastically to the message. Two things, he said, might reduce its significance: (1) U.S. action appears to be dependent on some signal that a contact will be reestablished by Hanoi and (2) there is an indirect linking - or request - that an appropriate step (re Saigon) will be taken by the other side which inevitably involves the NLF. While stating his willingness to transmit the proposal, he asked that it be worked over, since in its present form it would not be well received in Hanoi.

76. On December 22, Porter reported (Saigon's 14015) that D^rOrlandi said he had taxed Lewandowski with leaking information on the negotiations. Lewandowski emphatically denied this and the accompanying charge that he was writing a "paper" on the subject. Porter concluded that Lewandowski was obviously lying but he at least was aware of our knowledge of his indiscretion.

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77. On December 22, Assistant Secretary Bundy had a lengthy conversation with Alexander Zinchuk, the Soviet Charge, largely on the MARIGOLD subject (see memcon that date). Zinchuk emphasized in respect to MARIGOLD that (1) it was difficult for his Government to understand why we had intensified the bombing of Hanoi on December 3-4 and 13-14; (2) these actions left the Soviets - and by implication, Hanoi - in complete doubt as to our intentions; (3) while not defending the Polish handling of the affair, he emphasized that the Polish effort was serious and that the Soviets fully supported it. Bundy responded along the following lines: (1) We are definitely interested in serious bilateral talks of the kind envisaged by the Lewandowski approach; (2) weather is a considerable factor in our bombing patterns; (3) there had been no change in our targetting; (4) although we had always taken the Lewandowski approach seriously, as of early December we were most uncertain as to what contact had been made with Hanoi and whether Lewandowski was really speaking for Hanoi. Furthermore, the behavior of Lewandowski (leaks) and Rapacki had created an atmosphere of doubt around the entire series of exchanges; (5) in awareness of Hanoi's sensitivity about the intensification of bombing, we had made a specific proposal to this point; and (6) we are prepared to see really quiet and secret talks begin on the basis of the approaches that had been made.

78. On December 23, Porter, citing the constant requirement for police and military patrolling and other action against the VC in the Saigon area, said that he assumed that our proposal (para. 74) on the cessation of terrorist activity in the Saigon area does not envisage the cessation of GVN/US counter-VC activities (Saigon's 14089). The accuracy of this assumption was confirmed on the following day by the Department (State's 108413).

79. On December 24, D'Orlandi conveyed the following message to Habib (Saigon's 14206): (1) the Polish Ambassador in Rome told Fanfani that he had, under instructions, made known to the Pope "all details" of the negotiating effort; (2) Fanfani then requested the Polish Ambassador to inform Rapacki as follows: (a) Rapacki had been wrong not to initiate U.S. contact with Hanoi without delay and should do so now; (b) it was a violation of the secrecy agreement to inform the Pope; and (c) Lewandowski and D'Orlandi should remain in Saigon to keep the channel open.

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80. At 232114Z, the JCS instructed CINCPAC that, until further notice, no air operations should occur involving attacks against targets within 10 NM of the center of Hanoi. Reconnaissance operations were not affected by the directive.

81. On December 23, new instructions were sent to Gronouski which replaced subparas 2-3 of paragraph 74 (State's 107911). In essence they made the following points: (1) Rapacki had repeatedly stated that the December bombing has created the impression in Hanoi that we are attempting to pressure them into beginning negotiations and that this was an impediment to the beginning of the talks; (2) we have repeatedly denied this allegation; (3) however, we want to leave no stone unturned; (4) we have therefore removed what you (Rapacki) regard as the major impediment to the talks. There will be no bombing within 10 NM of the center of Hanoi for an indefinite period. If we understand you correctly, this action will permit the talks to begin promptly; (5) in judging whether Hanoi is as interested in successful negotiations as we are, we would be impressed by similar restraint on their part. This could take the form of a suspension of incidents in the Saigon area, a redistribution of NV forces in the area of the DMZ, action affecting infiltration, or perhaps, other examples which will occur to Hanoi.

82. On December 24, Gronouski conveyed his revised message to Rapacki (Warsaw's 1553 and 1555). Rapacki responded positively to this message and said he would convey it promptly to Hanoi.

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83. On December 27, Gronouski reported Michalowski's inquiry whether our reference to "ten miles from Hanoi was in nautical or statute miles" (Warsaw's 1567). Referring to ticker reports of alleged US bombing on December 26 of targets within 12 miles of Hanoi, Gronouski expressed considerable concern that we are choosing targets so close to the margin that even a slight error could put us in technical violation of our commitment. Such a violation, he said, could seriously dissipate the positive impact of our commitment.

84. Gronouski was promptly advised that he could inform the Poles that orders have been issued to refrain from bombing within the ten nautical miles from the center of Hanoi (State's 108664, December 27). The identification of the city center by coordinates clearly means that the ten miles does not apply as a distance from the outer city limits of Hanoi, however defined or claimed. Unless he was officially informed to the contrary, he was to assume that newspaper reports about distances probably refer to distances from the city rather than from a pinpointed center.

Gronouski was further advised that it was very important for him and for the Poles not to be diverted from the main effort by niggling and haggling about whether a particular bomb fell on this or that side of this or that circle. The significant fact is that an area of some 314 square nautical miles will be free from bombing and that, thus far, we have not seen the slightest indication of any reciprocal action nor have we thus far seen any readiness on the part of Hanoi to sit down and talk business. The next move is up to them and we cannot let them play games with a side issue in view of the major concession we have made to clear the way for talks.

85. On December 27, a combined instruction was sent to Rome, Saigon, and Warsaw (State's 108773). (a) Reinhardt was instructed to tell Fanfani (1) we are pleased that he had taken Rapacki to task for not initiating our contact with Hanoi without delay and that he had urged Rapacki to take this step without further delay; (2) that he should be aware that we had told Rapacki that we had halted bombing within ten nautical miles of the center of Hanoi and that we would be impressed by appropriate restraint on the

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other side; (3) we are grateful that he (Fanfani) had expressed concern to the Poles over their action in telling the Pope about MARIGOLD. We share his concern, particularly since the Pope may be receiving a one-sided account, and we would appreciate his advice whether we should ourselves indicate to the Pope that we are aware that he has been informed of the MARIGOLD effort. (b) Porter was told that, for security reasons, we are trying to remove MARIGOLD from Saigon and that he should not pursue the MARIGOLD subject at this time with D'Orlandi. (c) Gronouski was instructed to stress in strongest terms with Rapacki or Michalowski the need for total security and discretion.

86. In accordance with the Secretary's instructions, Assistant Secretary Bundy on December 27 brought Zinchuk, the Soviet Charge, up to date on MARIGOLD developments. Bundy told him we had given the Poles a direct message on December 22 and had subsequently revised it on December 24, as indicated in paragraph 81. Zinchuk said that he would report this information to Moscow although he felt that his Government had been directly informed by the Poles (Memcon, December 27).

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87. On December 28, Reinhardt conveyed to Fanfani the information contained in paragraph 85 (Rome's 3409). In response, Fanfani said he had been very severe in his conversation with the Polish Ambassador in making the points cited in paragraph 79. He said the Polish Ambassador returned to see him on December 27 and made the following points: (a) the Poles cannot undertake to initiate the U.S. contact with Hanoi unless there is a cessation of bombing; (b) Lewandowski will remain in Saigon; and (c) it was not the Polish Government which had taken the initiative in informing the Pope. On December 15, the Pope asked the Polish Government if they could tell him anything with respect to Viet-Nam. On December 19, the Polish Government responded by telling the Pope the whole story.

Fanfani said he had suggested to the Polish Ambassador that it was not necessary to await a cessation of bombing to initiate U.S. contact with Hanoi. This could very easily be done by the Poles asking NVN and U.S. representatives to meet in Warsaw to discuss clarification of "Points 3 and 5". Fanfani urged that we accept promptly if approached by the Poles with an invitation to participate in discussions on these two points (NB. Fanfani probably meant Points 2 and 5: Point 2 concerns the role of the NLF in a future GVN; Point 3 relates to U.S. military withdrawal and dismantling of bases; and Point 5 concerns the formation of a future GVN based on a free electoral process).

Fanfani thought the Pope would approach us after reflecting for a few days on the Marigold information given him by the Poles. At that time, he said, it would be appropriate for us to discuss the matter with the Pope. On the other hand, if we took the initiative now, Fanfani feared a three-cornered discussion might develop which could be very confusing.

88. On December 28, the Secretary called to Gronouski's attention the statement made to Fanfani by the Polish Ambassador that "the Poles cannot undertake to initiate a U.S. contact with Hanoi unless there is a cessation of bombing" (State's 109639). While noting that this could reflect the Ambassador's lack of information about our December 24 action, the Secretary observed that

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it raised the possibility that the Poles never had any intention of pressing Hanoi for talks without an unconditional and unreciprocal cessation of bombing. The Secretary also called to Gronouski's attention the very heavy seaborne resupply operation of the NVN during the two-day Christmas truce as a factor bearing on the central question of the good faith and the intentions of the other side. Expressing deep concern about the Poles disclosure of MARIGOLD to the Pope, he noted that we now are confronted with the fact that the Pope probably has received a very one-sided view of recent transactions and with the question as to whether we should correct that account by direct discussions with the Pope. Gronouski's comments on this aspect of the matter were requested.

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89. On December 29, Gronouski stated that he felt he should get an appointment with Rapacki on the 30th to express disappointment that we have received no response from Hanoi and to ask him how he reads the situation (Warsaw's 1583). He also contemplated raising the question of secrecy, saying we know they discussed the matter with Fanfani and we presume with Moscow. He would then ask Rapacki if they had discussed the subject with anyone else. He asked if he could allude to on that occasion to Lewandowski's leaks and if he could specifically cite the 500 boat resupply operation. He also thought we should without delay set the record straight with the Pope, despite Fanfani's advice that we should let the Pope take the initiative.

90. Later that day, Gronouski was advised that we believe Rapacki will pass on Hanoi's reply as soon as he receives it and an immediate demarche to him would indicate overeagerness on our part and might give the other side an opportunity to ask for further concessions or clarifications (State's 110170). However, on the occasion of their next meeting, Gronouski was authorized to stress the security aspect with him although we doubted the desirability of again hitting Lewandowski for his indiscretions. Gronouski was also authorized to refer to the concerted naval resupply operation during the Christmas period without citing a specific number of boats. He was also informed that we may go back to Fanfani shortly to reemphasize our concern about the version of MARIGOLD given to the Pope by the Poles and perhaps to stimulate a Vatican inquiry to us.

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Killed 91. On December 30 Rapacki conveyed to Gronouski the response to our demarche of December 24 (Warsaw's 1596). Coming directly to the substantive issue, Rapacki said our December 24 action could not make up for the damage done by our actions during the first part of December. Therefore, he said, "We have to consider our role at this stage as terminated." He said that "what has happened only strengthens us in the belief that only unconditional stopping of bombing of North Viet-Nam might create the atmosphere for a peaceful solution." When Gronouski stated that this development left him with the feeling that ~~an effort~~ may have been ~~killed~~ from the beginning, Rapacki disagreed. He said he did not think that "those authoritative people were kidding from the beginning.... Even between December 4 (after the first bombing) and December 13, the matter was again actively being considered. There had been no negative reaction as yet. The decision regarding breaking off the talks was made after December 13." Rapacki went on to express the personal judgment that, if our December 24 action had been taken 20 days earlier, the first contact with the DRV would be behind us.

When Gronouski urged Rapacki to participate with Canada and India in the proposed New Delhi ICC meeting, the Pole voiced two basic objections: (1) to hold a meeting while the bombing continued would be of questionable value. If the meeting occurred without a positive result, its impact could be dangerously negative; and (2) since India and Canada have not had the MARIGOLD experience, conversations within the Commission might be "divorced from the realities of the situation."

Emphasizing that we had maintained absolute secrecy about MARIGOLD, Gronouski asked if the Poles had divulged the talks to anyone except Fanfani and the Soviets. Rapacki responded in the negative but added that "probably the Pope is informed." When Gronouski asked by whom, Rapacki said "possibly Fanfani, but I don't know...". (The Polish Ambassador in Rome, under instructions, had told the Pope. See paras 79 and 87.) Rapacki then replied affirmatively to Gronouski's proposal that the rule of secrecy should prevail even though the talks are broken off.

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In summing up the situation, Gronouski commented that it would be an unfortunate misinterpretation of events to conclude that the Poles have led us down the "primrose path". He is convinced that the Poles (a) have had at least limited authority from Hanoi to investigate negotiation and Warsaw meeting terms; (b) they felt our December 24 position was a satisfactory one; (c) since December 24 they did what they could to induce Hanoi to enter negotiations; and (d) when this failed, they recognized Hanoi's intransigence and bowed out.

Gronouski recommended that (a) we immediately request the Soviets to take over and that the cessation of bombing around Hanoi be continued at least until the proposed Soviet effort fails or the Soviets respond negatively to our request; (b) we have the initiative and should exploit it with the Soviets, the Pope, and U Thant with the alternative objectives of either moving along the path toward negotiations or, if this fails, leaving us in a strong public relations position. Hasty withdrawal of our December 24 position, however, would seriously compromise either objective.

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92. On December 30, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin asked Llewellyn Thompson if anything new had developed in our conversations with the Poles. Thompson responded that Gronouski had met with Rapacki but we did not have his report as yet (Thompson-Dobrynin Memcon, December 30). Dobrynin then went on to say that the initial stages of this affair had given the Soviet Government considerable hope. Rather cryptically, he said they had other reasons for some optimism but our action in bombing Hanoi had spoiled everything. He stated that his Government was frankly baffled by our actions in Viet-Nam and he did not know how to judge our policy. Many wondered whether some of our military were deliberately trying to frustrate a policy of moving toward negotiations or whether our policy really was one of military victory. In reply, Thompson pointed out that our targets were selected several weeks in advance and it had been pure coincidence that the attacks on the targets near Hanoi had occurred at this time. He said he could assure Dobrynin that we are genuinely interested in negotiations and that, although there were some who felt that we should take a stronger action, this was not a question of military officers disobeying orders. Toward the end of the conversation, Dobrynin, with reference to the possibility of settling the Viet-Nam war in 1967, remarked that perhaps Thompson would be able to have contact in Moscow on this subject with a "certain Ambassador" (obviously the DRV Ambassador.)

93. On December 31, Porter expressed increasing puzzlement about the "Polish minuet danced by Rapacki" (Saigon's 14702). He observed that we still do not know with any clarity to what extent he, or Lewandowski in the past, reflected Hanoi's views. While assuming that the Poles may have had some detailed discussion with Hanoi, he felt that we cannot disregard the possibility that the Poles constantly manipulated the terms of understanding whether involving the "Ten Points" or later attempts to add provisos. While they claimed to speak for both us and Hanoi, we do not know how accurately they reflected the views of either side.

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Porter felt that we should (a) seek some way of breaking the Polish log jam and achieving a direct contact; and (b) introducing an intermediary who is more trustworthy from our standpoint than the Poles. He suggested that the Canadian ICC Commissioner, Victor Moore, who is going to Hanoi on January 6 to make farewell calls at the end of his tour, might fill this role. Porter felt we could prepare a careful scenario for Moore to follow on his visit, involving precise objectives to define the reality of Hanoi's willingness to pursue the Marigold concepts and procedures.

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94. On January 1, Paul Martin, the Canadian Foreign Minister, telephoned the Secretary to inform him that he was sending urgent instructions to Ambassador Ritchie to take up a sensitive subject with the Secretary. On the following day, Ritchie revealed to the Secretary that the subject was MARIGOLD. On December 28, Ignatieff, the Canadian Representative in New York, had called on U Thant to discuss the Canadian-Indian proposed ICC initiative. In the course of this discussion, U Thant permitted Ignatieff to read a biased report on MARIGOLD which had been given to him on December 23 by the Poles. Ritchie gave the Secretary a copy of the Ignatieff report for reproduction. Simultaneously, he expressed concern that U Thant, on the basis of the account given to him, believed that we had destroyed the possibility of talks by our bombing; furthermore, he implied that Paul Martin, on the same basis, would draw a similar conclusion. Ritchie also expressed concern that the Poles, in light of MARIGOLD, might suspect that if the Canadians pursued the ICC initiative they were doing so at US urging in order to obscure the US record on MARIGOLD.

The Secretary at once pointed out that this version of MARIGOLD was inaccurate in certain respects and incomplete in others even for the period through December 16. Furthermore, there is no indication that the Poles revealed any developments after that date. In respect to the ICC initiative, the Secretary expressed the tentative view that it was clearly important to proceed. If direct and secret talks materialized, the existence of the ICC forum could be a useful forum. Furthermore, the ICC could usefully take up such subjects as Cambodia.

95. In light of the known disclosures by the Poles, an acute danger was recognized that the Pope, U Thant and the Canadians all believe we were badly in the wrong. Furthermore, the widening of the MARIGOLD circle might lead at any moment to a highly unfavorable public disclosure. For these reasons, it was decided on January 3 to give the Pope, U Thant, the Canadians and British a full account of the whole episode and, for the time-being, to avoid any dramatic attacks on North Viet-Nam. In addition, it was decided to reiterate to the Canadians, Poles, and Indians that we take a completely favorable view of a possible ICC initiative.

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96. That afternoon, Ambassador Goldberg gave a detailed chronological account of MARIGOLD to U Thant. In the early evening, the Secretary called in UK Minister Michael Stewart and Assistant Secretary Bundy met with Canadian Ambassador Ritchie on the following day to convey similar messages, with emphasis on the following points: (1) Hanoi has given nothing to date, while the US has given the Poles full information and has been prepared to endorse a Polish draft summary of the US position; (2) the Poles have been extraordinarily vague as to just what was or was not said to them in Hanoi; (3) in haggling over the inevitable question of interpretation of Lewandowski's oral formulations, Rapacki appeared to be imposing new conditions; (4) the Lewandowski message of December 1 imposed only one condition--secrecy--for the initial contact in Warsaw. Neither side was under constraint to alter the pattern of its military operations; (5) on December 24, the US unilaterally undertook to refrain for an indefinite period from bombing near Hanoi. Hanoi refused to respond; (6) the US remains entirely prepared for secret bilateral contacts with Hanoi. Even though Rapacki has stated that he considers the channel now dead, the US proposal of December 24 remains in force; (7) we have maintained the tightest security on the whole project on the understanding that any disclosure of this series of discussions could affect Hanoi's willingness to participate. We will continue to do so and we urge others in the strongest terms to act in the same manner.

In introducing the subject with U Thant, Goldberg indicated that we are aware that the SYG had received information from other sources on the subject (USUN's 3458). U Thant confirmed that the Polish UN Representative had given him an extensive account in the utmost confidence. He said Goldberg's account coincided in many respects with the Polish account, although the Pole had stated that Rapacki and his Government believed that we had torpedoed the chance for peace talks with Hanoi by our bombing. Goldberg immediately rebutted this charge and emphasized that we had very much in mind constructive action by U Thant and we remained entirely prepared for secret bilateral talks with Hanoi. Goldberg also stressed that we have maintained the tightest security on the whole project and urged him in the strongest terms to act in the same manner.

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The SYG assured him that he would keep this in confidence and would advise Goldberg of any developments. He added that he would consider how he might be helpful in reinforcing our desire for direct bilateral contacts with Hanoi.

97. On January 3, Assistant Defense Secretary, John McNaughton, had a luncheon conversation with Soviet Minister Zinchuk in which MARIGOLD was raised by the latter. In sum, Zinchuk indicated that he believed the MARIGOLD exercise was serious, did have real promise, and was frustrated by the December bombings; that the proper "environment" can be re-created if we don't escalate and if we lay off Hanoi; that Poland may be back in the act and that the Soviets themselves may play a role; that first talks would be quiet NVN-US bilaterals; and that a settlement, "which would have to be worked out", would of necessity find a place for the NLF in the government of SVN (McNaughton-Zinchuk memcon, January 3).

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98. On the evening of January 3, the Secretary gave the British Minister a full summary of MARIGOLD in accordance with the basic texts used with U Thant, the Pope, and the Canadians. Stewart was obviously concerned that George Brown would feel that we should have informed him sooner.

99. On the following day, Stewart called Bundy to discuss what might be said to Brown as to why he had not been informed and why the two-phase proposal had been given to Lewandowski as well as to Brown. Stewart implied Brown might be upset since he had understood he was the unique channel for this message. Bundy replied that the double-channel was deliberate since we wanted the message to get through clearly and we were uncertain about the Lewandowski channel. Since the Polish channel required absolute secrecy, we were not free to divulge it. Stewart expressed great personal sympathy for these arguments.

100. Later in the day, Stewart delivered a note to the Secretary from George Brown. While thanking the Secretary for the information provided the previous evening, Brown wished that we had told him of this before he went to Moscow. "To put it mildly," he said, "a very valuable opportunity may have been lost. It is not surprising that the Russians were so puzzled". He concluded with the comment that if a "further opportunity arises I am sure you will keep me fully in the picture."

101. The Secretary promptly responded with a message to Embassy London for passage to Brown (State's 112632), expressing regret that a misunderstanding had arisen but pointing out that there was nothing on which we could have informed him prior to his visit to Moscow (Brown was in Russia from November 22 to November 25). Lewandowski was in Hanoi during the second half of November and we did not receive his report until December 1. It was also pointed out to Brown that we had given him for his trip a major concession to the other side in the form of a two-phased proposal in which we would stop the bombing if the other side would agree that subsequently there could be a deescalation of the violence.

102. When Ambassador Ritchie came in on January 4, Bundy gave him the same full written record for Paul Martin. Ritchie's only notable point was to express concern over our mention of the problem of security leaks if we had changed the bombing plan

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prior to December 13 and 14. Bundy responded that we did not consider the chances of a leak serious, but this factor had to be taken into consideration. Furthermore, it was our basic belief that we could not change things of the type we had been doing, and this was reinforced by the Polish behavior throwing doubt on the validity of the whole channel.

Bundy then raised the question of the proposed visit to Hanoi on January 6-21 of the Canadian ICC representative, Victor Moore. Bundy said it was our judgment--although the Canadians must decide--that Moore should not be fully informed on MARIGOLD. Any chance of reviving this channel might be disturbed if an additional party appeared in Hanoi, however inadvertently, to be aware of it. Nonetheless, if the Canadians wished, Moore might be armed with the two-phase proposal and an expression of U.S. willingness for direct conversations. He then gave him the following points for possible use by Moore:

a. While Mr. Moore is not carrying any message from the USG, it is the present Canadian understanding, on the basis of careful discussions with the USG, that the US would be prepared to consider a cessation of bombing and accompanying actions that would take place in two stages. The first stage would consist of the cessation of the bombing, to be followed by a second stage involving appropriate military actions on both sides which, in the aggregate and taken with the first stage, amounted to an equitable reciprocal reduction of hostilities. Both stages would have to be clearly agreed in advance. This USG view appears to be an amplification of the position stated by Ambassador Goldberg in September, and is designed to meet Hanoi's apparent position that the first move must be a cessation of the bombing. This general subject was of course discussed with Ambassador Ronning last June, and Mr. Moore has no doubt that the USG would be interested if Hanoi wished to express any views on it.

b. If it were at any time desired by Hanoi, the USG would be prepared for direct conversations with Hanoi representatives at any designated point. The purpose of such conversations might be to discuss such an arrangement for the reduction of hostilities or any other matter that Hanoi wished to consider. Again, Mr. Moore has no message from the USG on this subject, but is prepared, if Hanoi ever wishes, to offer to transmit any message by secure means.

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c. Mr. Moore notes that there have been no USG bombings in the Hanoi area or any exceptional attacks in general since December 14. (This point might be made in response to expected Hanoi claims that US bombing in December was in some sense an escalation. We do not suggest that Mr. Moore seek to rebut such charges, other than to refer to American statements that there was no intentional attack on Hanoi itself.)

103. On the same day, Ignatieff, the Canadian New York representative, asked Goldberg if he had straightened out U Thant on the MARIGOLD issue (USUN's 3465). Goldberg replied in the affirmative and then gave him the same summary he had given the SYG.

104. In the late afternoon, the Secretary reviewed the MARIGOLD chronology at length with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin (Rusk-Dobrynin memcon, January 5). The Secretary began by giving Dobrynin a copy of our "Fourteen Points" as they have been further developed in public discussion in 1966. After discussing each of the Points, the Secretary said it seemed the USSR and the US could broadly agree on them. Dobrynin said he would generally agree although there might be some particular points of interpretation and problems of "priorities". The Secretary then handed him a copy of Lewandowski's Ten Points on a Top Secret basis, pointing out it might be useful for him to have what we understood Lewandowski's points to be in English. The Secretary stating that our reference to the need for clarification in our first reply to Rapacki arose from the general nature of the Ten Points formulation. He indicated that Points 2 and 5 would have to be read together since they dealt with the same problem. Furthermore, the last sentence of Point 8 must not be read to believe that we could accept the continued presence of North Vietnamese armed forces in SVN. When Dobrynin emphasized the negative effect of the bombings of December 13-14 which "some in Moscow" believed raised serious doubts about the real intentions of the US, the Secretary replied we had doubts ourselves about the other side. He cited Rapacki's delay in dispatching our original message to Hanoi, protesting our reference to "clarification", the step-up in terror attacks in the Saigon area, and our need for caution in proceeding on the basis of a Polish formulation of our position with only the

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most insubstantial reflection of Hanoi's attitude. When Dobrynin said he understood Rapacki had told us in Gronouski's first meeting that we should go ahead and establish our own direct contact with the North Vietnamese, the Secretary took clear issue with him, pointing out that the record shows the entire exercise was related to a Polish role in actually arranging the first meeting. Dobrynin concluded that there might have been some misunderstanding. The Secretary told him that, if Moscow cannot tell us with assurance what Hanoi would do if we stopped the bombing, Moscow could at least tell us privately what Moscow could do. Dobrynin said this was a new idea. The Secretary's objective was not to present Dobrynin with a demarche but to have a wide-ranging discussion in an effort (a) to spread out for him the full range of our attempts to find a peaceful settlement and (b) to keep the USSR's attitude somewhat relaxed while further explorations of the possibilities of peace continue.

105. On January 4, Gronouski expressed strong differences with the views of Porter in respect to the Polish motivation and performance (see para. 93 and Warsaw's 1631). References to "Rapacki's Polish Minuet" and "procrastination by Rapacki" do not, in Gronouski's opinion, convey an accurate evaluation of the role played by Rapacki. Gronouski is convinced that Rapacki terminated Poland's role as a result of Hanoi's refusal to respond to what Rapacki regarded as a satisfactory, albeit belated US position on December 24. While the Polish Government is an outspoken ally of NVN and has been consistently and sharply critical of US bombing of NVN, it also has expressed interest in ending the Viet-Nam war for a variety of national Polish reasons. While recognizing that the Poles acted in Hanoi's interests in attempting to extract from us the best possible terms prior to actual negotiations, Gronouski does not believe that this is a basis for concluding that the Poles were not interested in initiating the Warsaw talks as soon as feasible. The procrastination was Hanoi's. The intermediary, he concluded, need be trustworthy only to the extent of its interest in getting negotiations started. More important than trustworthiness, in the sense of being a friend of the USG, is effectiveness in Hanoi. The best hope of finding this quality is in the Communist world, or possibly in the person of U Thant and de Gaulle.

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106. On January 5, D'Orlandi told Habib that Rapacki had informed Fanfani that he had "lost acceptability" with Hanoi, as a result of our bombing (Saigon's 14921). Fanfani had, therefore, instructed D'Orlandi to get in touch with Lewandowski with the idea of again using the latter as a channel to Hanoi with the objective of again urging Hanoi to meet with US representatives. Porter observed that this effort was curiously naive.

107. On the same day, Ambassador Reinhardt was instructed to see Pope Paul as soon as possible to tell him that we understand the Poles have given him certain information about MARI-GOLD (State's 112886). Furthermore, in view of the importance of this subject and its possible bearing on other initiatives to which the Pope is a party, we believe it essential that he receive a full and accurate account. (Reinhardt was then to convey the same information given the SYG, the Canadians and the British.)

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108. On January 5, Gronouski raised MARIGOLD again with Michalowski, requesting information on the Polish role and expressing surprise that Hanoi had categorically rejected our December 24 position (Warsaw's 1646, January 6) and Michalowski, in response, claimed (a) the Poles had exerted heavy pressure on Hanoi to authorize the Warsaw talks; (b) the Hanoi decision was made despite serious objections within the leadership; (c) the bombing of December 3 had strengthened the hand of the hard-liners and the incidents of December 13-14 destroyed the remaining confidence in Hanoi; (d) by December 24, a new situation existed and the Poles had lost their effectiveness; and (e) only a complete stopping of bombing would restore the confidence of those who are interested in negotiations. Gronouski then suggested that one approach to break the impasse would be to arrive at an initial Phase B deescalation agreement prior to the initiation of a meeting and negotiations between the USG and Hanoi. Using this approach, the Poles should obtain agreement from the two sides on specific verifiable actions each would take after a reasonable period of time following the implementation of Phase A. Under these circumstances, Phase A could go into effect and three weeks later Phase B could be executed, on the basis of a Polish initiative, by both sides. Once this happened, and had been verified by both sides, negotiations could commence between the USG and Hanoi. Gronouski said he was making this initiative on his own and, if the Poles were interested in pursuing it, he would get a reaction from Washington. While indicating doubts about the feasibility of this approach, Michalowski said he would discuss it with Rapacki. Gronouski then recommended that the Department prepare instructions for him to present to Rapacki which would suggest Phase B de-escalation alternatives which the two sides would put into effect three weeks after we implement Phase A.

109. Later that day, Gronouski was instructed (State's 114370) (a) that, in view of a complex of developments relating to the Viet-Nam problem, he was to take for the present no further initiatives along the lines he had suggested; (b) if the Poles responded to his suggestion, he should report their reactions while making clear to them that his suggestion was entirely his own and had not been cleared with Washington; (c) he should

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understand that the phasing concept had been based on a totality of de-escalatory actions. Thus, Hanoi's actions under Phase B would be expected to be generally equal to our actions in Phase B plus our action in stopping bombing in Phase A.

110. On January 6, Reinhardt was instructed to inform Fanfani of the latest MARIGOLD steps along the lines of the instructions previously conveyed to him (para 107 and State's 114278). While pointing out that the Warsaw phase seems to be at an end, he was to emphasize that we mean to continue to pursue the initiation of substantive discussions with the North Vietnamese. He was also to urge D'Orlandi to take no new initiatives with Lewandowski and to hold MARIGOLD in strict confidence.

111. On the same day, Porter was informed that in view of the passage by the Poles of information on MARIGOLD to the Pope and U Thant, and the subsequent leakage to the Canadians by the latter, we had discussed MARIGOLD in depth with the Pope, U Thant, the Canadians and the British (State 114277). In view of the possibility of a public disclosure, and the related speculation relating to the Salisbury articles and the Indian NIRVANA ploys, we conclude that an approach should be made to Ky. Porter was instructed to tell Ky (a) there is a groundswell of speculation about DRV willingness to talk; (b) this may represent a DRV effort to persuade us to stop the bombing or to cut it back in return for hints of DRV willingness to talk; (c) the GVN may be assured that we have no intention of changing our well-known position on conditions for the cessation of bombing, or yielding to pressures on any elements of our position; (d) as Lodge told Ky last July (para. 10), we will, of course, be following up any rumors, however unlikely, that might indicate Hanoi was really seeking a way out; (e) while we cannot exclude the possibility of some serious move by Hanoi, we do not see a sign of this as yet.

112. The Pope received Reinhardt on Sunday morning, January 8 (Rome's 3531). The Pope expressed understanding of the need for secrecy in respect to MARIGOLD and deep appreciation for the courtesy of being fully informed. He said, a fortnight or more ago, the Polish Ambassador in Rome had informed him that efforts had been made early in December in Warsaw to achieve

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direct US-Hanoi contact but these had broken down as a result of intensified bombing of Hanoi. The Pole had not provided detailed information about the conversations.

The Pope said he was always ready to be of any assistance if there were something he could do. Yet his role was essentially a religious and not a political one and his possibilities were limited. The Pope then spoke of his great preoccupation with the unbalanced public presentation of the Viet-Nam issue. He believed that a greater, more consistent and unremitting effort should be made to bring home to world opinion two points: one, that South Viet-Nam was the victim of aggression; and two, that the simple objective of the American effort was to relieve South Viet-Nam of this aggression and to provide it with a liberty of choice. He spoke of the confusion wrought in people's minds by such uncritical reporting as Harrison Salisbury's recent articles from Hanoi in the New York Times.

113. On January 9, Porter reported that Habib had briefed Tran Van Do in accordance with the instructions contained in para. 111 (Saigon's 15204). This was done, rather than a direct approach to Ky, to keep the dialogue in a low key. Do will inform the PM of our views. Porter said Do's reaction was predictably favorable. He was grateful for the briefing, emphasizing in particular his agreement that Hanoi may be probing for a change in our position, as well as trying to get us to stop bombing for nothing in return. He was pleased to note our assurance that we have no intention of changing our position on the cessation of bombing. He said he understood fully the need for us to explore all contacts, no matter how vague, and that, if ever anything positive showed up, the GVN would be prepared to consult. He felt it was premature to expect a change of attitude in Hanoi, but sooner or later this would happen.

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114. Ambassador Ritchie called Bundy on January 7 to express concern over a story in the Washington Post that Victor Moore, the Canadian ICC representative, was going to Hanoi on an exploratory mission for us. Bundy told him that we had not communicated with our people in Saigon on this subject. He and Ritchie agreed to handle the story by saying that Moore was going simply on a farewell trip. In response to Bundy's question about our proposed message, Ritchie said they had decided not to give any information to Moore about MARIGOLD and not to give him any instructions. Bundy surmised that the Canadians do not like to carry messages which have already been conveyed through others. Furthermore, he suspected that they are trying to keep the slate clear for a possible serious mission by Ronning or by Moore's successor in the future (Bundy-Ritchie Memcon, January 7).

115. Reinhardt saw Fanfani on the evening of January 9 and carried out the instructions contained in para. 110 (Rome's 3571, January 10). He also told him that the Pope had been informed in general terms of the exercise. Fanfani said that, shortly after the New Year, the Polish Ambassador had informed him of the interruption of the procedural talks in Warsaw and had said it was impossible to expect the North Vietnamese to enter into discussions with the US as long as the bombing of North Viet-Nam continues. Fanfani stated he had taken strong exception to this statement and had pointed out that US proposal envisaged the termination of bombing and that the Poles had known this all along. In addition he had told the Polish Ambassador that their present attitude seemed to him to raise a question as to the bona fides of the Lewandowski initiative. Subsequently, Fanfani had informed D'Orlandi of the foregoing who had replied that in Saigon Lewandowski was showing no interest in taking a further initiative. At this point, Reinhardt reiterated to Fanfani our desire that D'Orlandi should take no new initiatives and also reiterated the importance of holding all past and present developments in strictest confidence.

116. On January 10, Michael Shenstone, First Secretary of the Canadian Embassy, called on Chester Cooper to report on ICC developments. At the end of the session, Shenstone said that

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they had reason to believe that the Indian Ambassador in Warsaw had some knowledge of the MARIGOLD exercise. According to the Canadian Ambassador in Warsaw, his Indian colleagues pointed out in December that they could not expect the Poles to agree to an ICC meeting since the Poles were already negotiating directly with the Americans to establish talks with the North Vietnamese (Cooper's Memo for the Record, January 10).

117. On January 11, Gronouski was brought up-to-date on certain MARIGOLD developments since his last meeting with Rapacki on December 30 (State's 116301). Since the Poles had given misleading accounts of MARIGOLD to the Pope and to U Thant, who had passed it to the Canadians, the decision was taken to inform the Pope, U Thant, Fanfani, the Canadians, British and Soviets in summary of the MARIGOLD history. In all cases, it was either stated or implied that the Warsaw phase of the exercise appears to have, at least temporarily, ended. Nevertheless, we will continue to search for a means of initiating substantive discussions with the North Vietnamese. The prime importance of maintaining strict security was emphasized. In view of the foregoing and the plethora of rumors about contacts with the DRV, we also instructed Saigon to inform the GVN that we have received a number of third country messages relating to contacts, or alleged contacts, with DRV representatives from which those third countries have on occasion drawn unwarranted conclusions; we intend to follow up on any rumors that might indicate that Hanoi is really seeking a way out and will be in touch with the GVN if any of these appear to be of substance. Gronouski was requested not to discuss MARIGOLD with anyone in Warsaw except authorized Poles (here the instructions contained in para. 109 were to apply) and specifically not with representatives in Warsaw of other countries cited above; only the top officials of those countries have been informed on a very restricted basis.

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118. On January 12, Gronouski reported that Indian Ambassador Rapkumar has some awareness of MARIGOLD and Canadian Ambassador Berliss has had a briefing by his Foreign Office on MARIGOLD through December 16. Gronouski and Berliss felt that the Indian probably received his information from the NVN Ambassador rather than from the Poles. Berliss told Gronouski that Foreign Minister Martin was quite disturbed because he had not been informed of MARIGOLD in December when he conveyed to us the Indian ICC initiative. Martin apparently felt Canada could have been in a rather exposed position moving ahead on the ICC venture without knowing that MARIGOLD was in process. He suggested, however, that Martin is now mollified (Warsaw's 1701).

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119. On January 10, Prime Minister Wilson raised the subject of MARIGOLD with Ambassador Bruce, expressing considerable sensitivity about not having been informed about MARIGOLD. Since he assumed the Soviets were fully read in on the relations between Lewandowski and the USG, he felt he was being treated in this respect as a second class citizen. He was particularly concerned that when he met Kosygin in February the latter might possess information that was not available to him. He asked if we would send some one to London to tell him the details of this matter, as well as anything we thought he ought to know about other approaches we may be engaged in (letter from Amb. Bruce to Secretary Rusk, dated January 10, which was received in the Department on January 15).

120. On January 12, before the Bruce letter reached Washington, a cryptic wire was received from the Prime Minister, stating that he had told Bruce that he is "seriously concerned" about a matter which is "pretty fundamental to our relationship" (State's 117086 to London, January 12).

121. On January 15, UK Ambassador Dean conveyed George Brown's feeling on the same subject to Bill Bundy (State's 118905 to London). Dean said Brown was still very hurt over our failure to tell him we were conveying the new two-stage proposal on stopping bombing through the Lewandowski channel at the same time that Brown was going to Moscow with it. In response, Bundy gave Dean a detailed explanation of our rationale in dealing with the Brown and Lewandowski missions, including an assurance that we recognized an absolute obligation never to put the British in a false position and hence to provide them with all information they needed for any contacts they had. At the same time, we are playing a multiple chess game and cannot be expected to cut the British in on all boards at all times. Bundy then described the moves now under way as follows:

a. Salisbury - The Secretary had told Dean on the previous night of our read-out from Salisbury of Pham Van Dong's statement that "we know what we should do" if the US stopped bombing, this was the same formula used last summer with Sainteny (also with Petri) but, since the Vietnamese refused to elaborate, it did not get us much further.

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b. Baggs-Ashmore - We will have a report from them this week about their observations in Hanoi. This was an individual initiative. Although we had discussed our position in general terms with them, they had no authority to speak for us.

c. Sainteny - Sainteny had made a strong pitch (through Ambassador Guest) to go to Hanoi to take a sounding. We are taking him up on this and will arm him with the two-phase proposal.

d. Thompson - Amb. Thompson would discuss Viet-Nam seriously in Moscow in the coming days.

Bruce was told that, if the President concurs, we will request him to see Wilson as soon as possible to convey this message. (he was also sent a copy of the basic message, State's 112886, which was presented to the Pope). He was also informed that Chester Cooper would be available in a few days to help him.

122. On January 15, Lodge had a useful exchange of views in Rome with Fanfani although nothing new of significance emerged (Rome's 3664). Fanfani said that D'Orlandi had reported that Lewandowski had been discouraged by the turn of events in late December but had attached great significance to the New Year's Greetings he received from Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong. Fanfani expected that, on Lodge's return to Saigon, Lewandowski may be proposing further initiatives. Fanfani also relayed earlier comments which the Italians had received from the Poles expressing suspicion that the US may be working out some deal directly with the Chicoms.

123. On the same day, additional instructions were sent to Thompson for his forthcoming discussions with the Soviet leaders on Viet-Nam (State's 118903). It was suggested that (a) he begin with some general propositions and then move to some specific points; (b) a kick-off could be the Kosygin-Kohler talk on the eve of the latter's departure from Moscow when Kosygin referred to our "common interests" in Asia. We believe these interests exist and we are prepared to explore them; (c) Viet-Nam is the

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most difficult immediate problem we face in Asia and we seek Moscow's views and advice on how hostilities can be de-escalated and a fair and honorable settlement achieved; (d) Dobrynin seemed to feel that Moscow would find nothing to quarrel about in our up-dated Fourteen Points; (e) the Secretary had made the point with Dobrynin that, if Moscow could not give us any assurances from Hanoi in the event we stopped bombing, we would be interested in what the Russians themselves would do should bombing stop; (f) the "Phase A-Phase B" formula which George Brown advanced in November in Moscow could be raised again; (g) we cannot promise to maintain bombing restraint indefinitely in the vicinity of Hanoi and we would welcome some indication that Hanoi is ready to do something meaningful in response; (h) if Hanoi, the Poles, or anyone else is holding off decisions in respect to reciprocal action on the assumption that the US can be pressured into changing its position, they should abandon this hope. The US will under no circumstances stop bombing without some reciprocal response; (i) we hope the Soviets, who are sophisticated in international affairs, will both understand our views and educate others; (j) we are aware Hanoi may be reluctant to embark on negotiations without some knowledge of what the eventual outcome might be. Therefore, we are prepared to reveal in some detail to Hanoi our conception of a fair and workable settlement; (k) we have asked Hanoi where they might wish to hold private, secret talks and we await their reply; (l) the current situation in China, and the up-coming Tet period, makes an early initiation of talks on a settlement both necessary and advantageous; (m) in sum, even if Kosygin is not forthcoming in general, the ball is in the Soviet court on several specific points and Thompson should endeavor to get them to respond.

124. On January 16, Lodge had an audience with the Pope (Rome's 3678, January 17). The Pope again expressed concern about how badly our case was being presented in the world. He made it clear that he was aware of our prowess in blocking communist military victories but urged us "to win morally and psychologically. He recognized that if we stood aside in Viet-Nam, the consequences would be disastrous. Lodge concluded his report with a recommendation that we make a fresh effort to get publication of the figures on the deliberate killing of Vietnamese civilians by the Viet Cong.

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125. On January 18, Chester Cooper concluded that all is well following his meetings with Prime Minister Wilson and Foreign Minister Brown during which he gave them a rundown on the MARIGOLD history and present status, as well as on Salisbury, Petri, Sainteny and highlights of the Dobrynin-Rusk conversation. He reported that they are now ready to concentrate on the immediate future rather than the recent past. He had promised that we would do everything we could to keep them on top of the Viet-Nam issue in preparation for the Kosygin visit. He had also told them there might be matters which we would not discuss with them because they are too trivial or, in our judgment, too sensitive. They accept this (London's 5694).

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125. Cooper's more detailed report of his conversations with Wilson and Brown, which was received on January 19 (London's 5707), revealed that the British leaders had conveyed three specific requests:

a. Kosygin will be in London February 6-13. This brackets Tet. The British believe their talks with Kosygin, and his behavior, will be influenced by whether or not we are bombing North Viet-Nam at the time. They would understand if we did not stop bombing until the beginning of Tet on the 8th but they hope we will maintain the pause until after Kosygin leaves on the 13th (This is at least a day longer than our planned pause);

b. If talks between US and DRV representatives are started during Tet, they feel strongly we should avoid resuming bombing after the Tet stand-down and until we are convinced that the talks are getting nowhere;

c. They would like to be kept fully informed of our position, and our discussions with the North Vietnamese and the Russians, until the Kosygin visit is concluded. At the very least, they would like a full run-down on Thompson's talks in Moscow.

Wilson professed not to know why Kosygin had extended his stay but speculated that he might hope thereby to keep the Tet stand-down going for an extra few days and thereby to increase whatever possibilities there might be for useful talks. Wilson indicated Cooper's visit was perhaps a sufficient answer to the letter (sic: see cable in para. 120) he had sent to the President but implied that he would be pleased if the President could send him even a short note in response to his communication.

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126. On January 19, D'Orlandi told Lodge that Lewandowski was eager to make another trip to Hanoi, provided Lodge could give him something to say (Saigon's 16017). According to D'Orlandi this offer was made despite (a) the sharp contradiction to the spirit of MARIGOLD involved in our heavy bombing of Hanoi on December 13 and 14; (b) the proposal of Gronouski to stop bombing of the Hanoi area if the other side stopped terrorism in the region of Saigon which Lewandowski found offensive because it is the type of "tit for tat" bargaining which he had thought had been eliminated as a result of the MARIGOLD talks; (c) he suspects we are not using the MARIGOLD talks as the sole channel, but are shopping around elsewhere. In particular, he suspects us of direct conversations with Mainland China. On the other side of the case, D'Orlandi believes that Lewandowski thinks that the failure of the MARIGOLD conversations so far was due to Rapacki's conduct after we had accepted the offer to have some one deliver the message in Warsaw on December 6. Lodge requested instructions.

127. On January 20, Eugene Rostow reported from Rome that Fanfani told him that he had been approached by Hanoi in Rome during the last few days to inquire whether he would arrange talks with us (Rome's 3787). Fanfani told the interlocutor who was a direct representative and not an East European that there already was a channel for such talks; that he did not wish to cause any confusion; and that he would inquire of us before responding further. Rostow told him that it was essential to coordinate all such probes from the Secretary's office, and that further word would come promptly through Reinhardt.

128. On January 19, Gronouski was brought up-to-date in respect to NIRVANA, PRIMROSE and Harrison Salisbury (State's 121586). He was informed that we are treating these developments seriously for action purposes but, at the same time, we believe we may be confronted with a strong attempt by Hanoi, perhaps aided consciously by the Poles and, in any case, sympathized with by the

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Indians, to get us to stop the bombing without any reciprocal action except possibly some claimed willingness to talk. Furthermore, we are aware of the possibility that Warsaw and Hanoi may think they can press us into additional concessions over and above our December 24 proposal. Any expectation of this nature could serve to delay the initiation of serious moves.

Gronouski was also told that Thompson would be making these points in Moscow as soon as possible. Gronouski was to refrain from a direct approach to the Poles on this subject and was not to be drawn into a substantive discussion of PRIMROSE. In the event the Poles raised the bombing question, he was to leave them in no doubt that any stopping of the bombing would require a clear picture of reciprocal actions that amount to an equitable reduction of hostilities.

129. On January 20, Lodge noted that a continuing check on VC incidents in the Saigon-Gia Dinh area raises the question as to whether there has been some diminution of incidents initiated by the VC since January 4 (Saigon's 14894 and 16144). This, in turn, raises the question whether we are seeing a VC pause in the area ten miles around Saigon as a response to our own action in the Hanoi area. While the answer seemed to be negative, the number of recent incidents has been small. Lodge felt it desirable at this stage to inform Westmoreland of our December 24 proposal, although not in the MARIGOLD context. He believed Westmoreland could help in the task of analyzing VC actions and, more significantly, we might be able to use the knowledge to our own military advantage.

130. On January 21, the President sent a short message to Prime Minister Wilson expressing the hope that the discussions with Bruce and Cooper had settled the questions raised earlier with Bruce and would put him in a knowledgeable position to deal with Kosygin.

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131. Wilson responded on the same day, expressing gratitude for the prompt dispatch of Cooper to London. He said it is essential that he be completely up-to-date when Kosygin arrives in London February 6. He hoped to be briefed shortly before that date and noted that another visit by Cooper would be admirable.

132. On January 21, Goldberg reported that Drew Pearson had told him that a Communist source, who Goldberg thinks was Dobrynin, had told Pearson that a substantial peace initiative was aborted because of the U.S. bombing on December 13-14. Goldberg urged Pearson not to accept this notion, that it is much more complicated than this, and printing such a story would mean that Pearson had fallen victim to a communist ploy.

133. On January 21, Reinhardt was instructed to seek an early appointment with Fanfani to explore the approach cited in para. 127 (State's 123197). He was to tell Fanfani that we shared his desire to avoid confusing channels to the DRV but, at the same time, we are acutely interested in the approach which he has reported. In order to assess its possibilities, we would appreciate Fanfani's: (a) identification of the interlocutor and assessment of his credentials; (b) precise time of his contact with the interlocutor; (c) his assessment of the communication system which would be used by the interlocutor; and (d) his views on how a contact might be established if we decided to explore this new channel.

134. On January 21, Lodge was informed of our doubts that there had been a real slowdown on the other side (State's 123198). Moreover, we were reluctant to expand the circle of those who are privy to MARIGOLD. He was therefore encouraged to establish a watch on terror incidents in the Saigon area without informing Westmoreland.

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Lodge was also informed of Fanfani's contact with a DRV representative. He was instructed not to tell D'Orlandi about this matter. In addition, he was told that we are leary of giving Lewandowski anything new to work with at least until we see what comes out of the Fanfani report.

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135. After the ceremonial presentation of credentials on January 23, Thompson had a lengthy conversation with Podgorny, largely on Viet-Nam (Moscow's 3159). When Thompson asked Podgorny if he had seen a report on the Rusk-Dobrynin conversation, he replied in the negative. He went on to say that he did not exclude the possibility of Viet-Nam taking certain steps but pointed out that the precondition for that would be at least a minimum move by the US, such as, initially, cessation of bombing. Since no such move was evident, he judged that hardly anyone could mediate. When asked about the Soviet reaction to Brown's two-phase proposal, Podgorny said the proposal supported the U.S. position to a certain extent and it is difficult to find a kernel of solution in it. He asserted that despite repeated US statements that Hanoi would not be bombed and despite subsequent US assurances that the ten-mile zone would be observed, the US is no longer willing to keep that promise. Lodge had agreed with the Polish ICC Representative to "meet with Ambassadors" but then the US began bombing Hanoi. He said it seemed we had no direct contact with North Vietnamese and he wondered why we did not establish such a contact.

136. On January 23, the Canadian Embassy gave Bundy a copy of a memcon covering a January 16 meeting in New York between Ignatieff and Michalowski. Ignatieff opened the discussion by emphasizing the Canadian desire to examine whether any of the initiatives currently in train held out any prospect of closing what appeared to be a narrowing gap between the two sides in the Viet-Nam conflict, namely (1) progress through the instrumentality of the ICC; (2) recent Polish mediatory activities (Michalowski commented wryly that these were supposed to be unknown to the Canadians); and (3) U Thant's efforts.

(1) Michalowski said Rapacki would shortly reply to Martin's message. He stated a meeting of all three ICC countries ran the risk of being construed as a "big political" meeting, which the Poles wished to avoid. He discounted the prospects of any ICC initiatives being productive in the present situation.

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(2) Michalowski admitted that the Polish reply to the Indian initiative had been purposely held back because they were at that time engaged in a negotiation of their own. This negotiation was now finished due to US bombing of targets within the Hanoi perimeter on December 13-14. He said that on December 1, they had given the USG more than an indication of a response from Hanoi. They had told the Americans that the North Vietnamese were prepared to make direct contact with them without condition of a prior cessation of bombing. This was farther than Hanoi had been prepared to go at any previous time. Following the December 2-3 bombing, the Poles had warned the Americans about "14 times" that any repetition would lead to a rupture of the contacts which were in the course of being established. Then came the renewed bombing of December 13-14.

Michalowski said this was a "stupid and irresponsible act". It was a blow struck against Warsaw as much as against Hanoi, putting Poland in an impossible position vis-a-vis the DRV. He said this was not simply a decision by the US military. He could not believe that the President did not have the means of stopping this operation.

Michalowski said we are now much further back than we had been on December 1 and it was a firm Polish belief that no fresh initiative could henceforth be launched without prior cessation of bombing.

Ignatieff reported that Michalowski did not attempt at any point to explain why Hanoi had been prepared to be as accommodating as his account of the negotiations suggested. He noted that this omission was particularly interesting in light of his claims that the North Vietnamese are achieving their objectives on the battlefield.

(3) Michalowski discounted the possibilities of U Thant playing a useful role.

137. Reinhardt saw Fanfani in the evening of January 23 (Rome's 3812, January 24), in respect to the approach cited in para. 133. In reply to Reinhardt's question, Fanfani said that his

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interlocutor was not Vietnamese and had simply informed him that Hanoi was prepared to send to him a representative if this were agreeable. He had told the interlocutor he would have to think it over. He said he did not wish to cause confusion and did not wish to get involved in a La Pira-type floor show. The contact had taken place on January 24, prior to his meeting with Rostow. Reinhardt and Rostow were the only ones informed of this approach. Reinhardt's efforts to induce Fanfani to identify his interlocutor were unsuccessful.

In response to Reinhardt's suggestion that he should on a personal basis seek to elicit more information from his interlocutor, Fanfani said he would ask him four questions: (a) the identity of the Hanoi representative; (b) his position official or otherwise; (c) his terms of reference; and (d) how he was to be recognized.

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138. On January 27, we received from Kenneth Young of the Asia Society a copy of a memorandum, dated January 17, covering his conversation on January 10 in New York with George Michalowski. In respect to Viet-Nam, Michalowski said that American bombing had destroyed the probability of negotiations just as they were about to be arranged. Therefore, he had concluded that some Americans, although not the President, had deliberately sabotaged diplomatic efforts by particular bombing attacks at certain times. Nevertheless, he felt that there was still a chance for negotiations to get underway between Hanoi and Washington if the bombing could be stopped indefinitely but not necessarily unconditionally. His main fear seemed to be that a continuation of an American hard line or military escalation would inevitably lead to a "cultural revolution" in Hanoi and the phenomenon of Vietnamese Red Guards. According to Michalowski, the only subject for negotiation is the polite withdrawal of American forces and the sequence for unification of Viet-Nam under the Vietnamese Communist Party nationalist leadership.

139. On January 27, Lodge reported that Joseph Fried, the Viet-Nam correspondent of the New York Daily News, had told him that he "knew" that Gronouski and the Polish Government had been having conversations about settling the war in Viet-Nam (Saigon's 16677).

140. On January 29, Lodge submitted another in a series of reports on VC initiated incidents within ten miles of Saigon. There appeared to be four VC-initiated incidents in the January 21-27 period (Saigon's 16785).

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141. On January 27, Ambassador Dobrynin raised the Viet-Nam issue with Walt Rostow (memcon January 27). Dobrynin explained the emotional reaction in Hanoi and Moscow to the bombing of Hanoi on December 13-14. Rostow again explained to him that, as he knew, there was no plan to put pressure diplomatically on Hanoi at that stage and that subsequent events made it clear that this was not the case. He also reiterated that the ten-mile circle around Hanoi was not a commitment "forever". Dobrynin said our position on this matter was now clear in Moscow.

Dobrynin said it was his personal view that only a direct, bilateral, secret discussion between the US and Hanoi could be effective. There had been too many intermediaries. Each of them tried to make himself "important". In this connection, he spoke rather mockingly of the British.

No reference was made to the Moscow contact.

142. On January 31, Goldberg informed U Thant of the reports about NVN views which we had received from the Indians and Egyptians (USUN's 3808). In the course of this discussion, U Thant informed Goldberg of the report on MARIGOLD given to him by Michalowski on January 15. According to Michalowski, the ten points developed during discussions in Saigon had not been a NVN nor Polish formulation but one prepared by Lodge. U Thant said he understood these were agreed on November 14-15, that Lewandowski had gone to Hanoi on the 17th and had come back with the definite agreement of the NVN to commence talks with the US in Warsaw in mid-December. He understood Lewandowski had informed Lodge on December 1, at which point Lodge had said some clarifications on the points would be necessary. Lewandowski had said this could be done in the meeting in Warsaw and Lodge had then suggested the date of December 6. Michalowski told U Thant that the US then began to escalate bombing of NVN on December 1, 3 and 4, culminating in attacks on Hanoi on December 13 and 14. On the latter date, Rapacki received a message from Hanoi that the talks were off. U Thant said he had asked Michalowski whether a bombing pause had been a requirement for a meeting and that Michalowski had said no but there was not supposed to have been any escalation.

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Goldberg, in response, told U Thant that the Ten Points had been prepared by Lewandowski on the basis of conversations that had been held with Lodge and that we had then confirmed them as generally representing our position subject to clarifications referred to by Lodge. He also told him that, after our agreement to the talks, the Poles had delayed about setting the time and we had the impression that the failure to convene the talks came from policy problems in Hanoi which preceded the events of December 13-14. He also reiterated that we had later extended the interdiction on bombing around Hanoi to ten miles to show our good will and that we still had no hesitancy about agreeing to secret talks while bombing goes on if this proves to be the best course.

143. On February 1, Lodge submitted certain observations on our instructions (State 128807) to Cairo in the Tulip series (Saigon's 17052). He pointed out that any implication that Hanoi is agreeing to talk "unconditionally", providing we stop the bombing, is an absurdity. In the Phase A-B proposal which he had put to Lewandowski, it was always implicit and fundamental that if we stopped bombing without conditions under Phase A, they would do something of substance under Phase B. It has never been our position that we would give up our blue chip without getting anything for it except the willingness to talk. He went on to say that we do not wish to back them up against a wall by forcing them to make needless verbal commitments. They can avoid this embarrassment by agreeing to private talks--anytime or any place.

144. On February 2, the Washington Post carried a story, dated from the UN, by Robert Estabrook to the effect that a Polish initiative to establish peace discussions between NVN and the US failed because of American bombing in mid-December. One "informed source" was quoted as saying that "the Americans bungled it". It was further asserted that the Poles were extremely frustrated, not merely over the effect of the bombing, but more particularly with the uncooperative attitude of Hanoi.

145. On February 2, Goldberg reported that Estabrook told a Mission officer that his source was a high Polish official, corroborated by "other E. European sources" (USUN's 3847). He also said he had been given a similar impression earlier in January from Paul Martin. He had also taken the story to U Thant

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who stated his belief that it was correct. Goldberg's personal assessment was that the original source of the story is the Poles who have been quietly spreading it through the UN. He felt the Poles have put the worst possible light on each development. This led Goldberg to recommend that we should no longer use Poland or any other Bloc country as a channel to Hanoi.

146. On February 3, Gronouski reported that the Warsaw AP correspondent had asked him to comment on the Estabrook story and that he had refused (Warsaw's 1881).

147. On the same day, guidance was sent to Gronouski on this question (State's 130664), which in essence stated: (1) we had sought some indication of a reciprocal response which would justify the cessation of bombing; (2) there has been no indication of such a response from Hanoi; (3) consequently we see no merit in the position that our bombing has interfered in any way with the prospect for discussing a peaceful settlement.

148. On February 4, Goldberg reported that Don Grant, St. Louis Post Dispatch, had informed a Mission Officer that he also had the story for ten days on the Polish peace efforts and that U Thant had reconfirmed it to him after Estabrook had published it (USUN's 3904). Grant said he had not published it because he feared the repercussions on peace talks if such a story were published prematurely. He also said a Polish-Mission source had told him the Mission had received a long cable from Warsaw on February 3 reporting that Hanoi was furious over the press leak on the possibility of the December talks with us. Hanoi was said to feel that they are now in a very embarrassing position vis-a-vis Peking for having agreed to secret talks with US without informing the Chinese. Goldberg said this information confirmed his conviction that (a) the original sources were Poland; (b) the Canadians then confirmed the story to Estabrook and (c) the SYG felt he was unable to deny the story.

149. On February 4, the Washington Post carried a headline story by Estabrook which was quite incomplete and misleading. Department spokesmen replied to press inquiries as follows (Depcirtel 131690): "As a matter of policy, we do not believe it would promote peace in Viet-Nam to comment on accounts of any alleged

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private talks or events leading to them. The President sufficiently characterized the situation at his press conference last Thursday."

150. All posts were informed by Depcirtel (State's 131700) of our official position on the story. In addition, a special approach was made in respect to the story to the governments of the troop-contributing countries. Australia and New Zealand were handled by direct discussions with Embassy officers. In addition, a circular cable was sent to Bangkok, Seoul, Manila, Tokyo (non-contributor), and info to Taipei (Depcirtel 131717). Our Ambassadors were instructed to inform the host governments that the story emanated from non-US sources, and is incomplete and misleading. There had been contacts in which the Poles both in Saigon and in Warsaw had served as intermediary, and in the month of December there were frequent exchanges. We were never sure whether the Poles were speaking for Hanoi or entirely for themselves and we concluded ultimately that the exercise had been primarily a fishing expedition by the Poles in order to get us to change with respect to bombing of North Viet-Nam. They may have intended then to present such a change to Hanoi and had perhaps led Hanoi to expect this. When we declined to change our position, nothing further developed. Throughout this exercise, we had not undertaken to make any change in our basic position. At the same time, we had indicated a readiness to consider the possibility of direct talks without conditions with North Viet-Nam with the objective of bringing about a peaceful settlement.

151. On the same day, Lodge was instructed to convey the information cited above to Ky, adding that we would naturally be in touch with the GVN if there were really substantive developments in this field (State's 131715). It was also suggested that Ky's attention be called to Walt Rostow's February 3 statement that an "extremely interesting and delicate" phase of diplomatic probes is now underway and "this is a bad time to talk about any particular stand which might turn out to be a negotiating situation." Lodge was instructed to decline comment if asked about his contacts with Lewandowski and d'Orlandi. He was also asked to convey a similar suggestion to them.

152. On February 4, Embassy Moscow was instructed to inform the DRV representative that the Estabrook story came from Polish sources. We will be maintaining a policy of complete silence, avoiding any comment (State's 131714).

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153. On February 6, a statement was sent to Canberra and Wellington, covering the extensive account of MARIGOLD which was given to the Australian and New Zealand Ambassadors on February 4 (State's 132347).

154. On the same day, Goldberg reported that on February 3 he had expressed displeasure to the Polish Ambassador at the press leaks concerning the Saigon conversations relating to proposed talks in Warsaw. Although he did not directly charge the Poles with responsibility, the implications of what he said leaned in that direction. The Polish Ambassador seemed very embarrassed and his attitude served to confirm Goldberg's impression that the Poles were responsible for the leaks. Goldberg noted that Hanoi has also reacted, since the Ambassador said they had given indication they did not welcome leaks either (USUN 3908).

155. On February 7, Lodge reported that he had carried out the instruction contained in para. 151 (Saigon's 131715). Ky seemed to accept the report in good spirit. He noted, however, that the Catholics were becoming alarmed about the "peace rumors", and he feared similar concern might arise among the Buddhists and the military. The hopeful element of the situation, he said, was that "everyone knew" how strongly anti-Communist he and Thieu were.

156. On February 7, the Polish Ambassador in Moscow indicated to Thompson an awareness of MARIGOLD and the Estabrook story (Moscow's 3387). He speculated the source might have been the UN Secretariat. Thompson replied that that would be impossible in view of the steps taken to limit knowledge of MARIGOLD even in the US Government unless of course someone else had informed the UN officials. When Thompson said we would make no public comment, the Ambassador replied this was good.

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157. On February 7, Harold Wilson responded to a parliamentary question about the December discussions with the Poles by stating that he had "all the details on this subject" and that there had been "mutual misunderstandings". Rostow promptly sent a private message to Palliser expressing acute displeasure about these comments.

158. On February 8, an instruction was sent to Bruce and Cooper to reiterate and emphasize all his points in strongest terms (State's 133105). The essence of our disclosure of this development to the British was the preservation of confidence. Wilson's comments had undercut the public position of the President and are bound to have serious complicating effects on our relations with Saigon and with our Manila allies, who had not received similar full accounts.

159. On February 8, Gronouski reported that, based on personal knowledge of the precedents, he had reached quite different inferences and conclusions regarding the Estabrook articles than those drawn by Goldberg (Warsaw's 1939). He felt a theory that the story initially came from Paul Martin and was confirmed by U Thant and the Poles would be far more supportable on the basis of available information.

160. In his press conference on February 9, Secretary Rusk responded to a question as to whether he could elucidate on the "misunderstandings" on both sides as follows:

"No, because to do so would, in my judgment, get in the way of the possibilities of using existing channels to try to move this matter toward peace. It is not for me to talk about reports of particular channels to try to move this matter toward peace. It is not for me to talk about reports of particular channels that might have existed at one time or another, or were speculated about. When the full story comes out some day, it will be rather different than some of the things you have heard."

161. On February 12, Fanfani asked that the following points be conveyed to the Secretary (Rome's 4183):

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1. I am cheered by the decision today not to recommence bombings of NVN;
2. Since this realizes one of the important premises specified in the known tripartite meetings in Saigon of last November and December, I wish to confirm that, should it be necessary, Italy's collaboration is available for all the steps and contacts which might be necessary;
- 3.. Hoping for a felicitous result of today's decision, I send my best regards.

162. On February 14, D'Orlandi informed Lodge of Fanfani's message to the Secretary, indicating the way was open for further action and that Italian diplomacy would gladly be helpful (Saigon's 17948). D'Orlandi said Lewandowski would be back from Hanoi on the following day and that he, D'Orlandi, would be in touch with Lodge if anything of interest developed. D'Orlandi expressed the opinion that it would be impossible for Hanoi to agree to stop infiltrating in return for a bombing stoppage but it would be "more feasible" from their point of view to agree to a curtailment of assassinations in exchange for surcease from bombing. Lodge then expressed the view that Hanoi would be brought around in a hurry if (1) we and the South Vietnamese really started to eliminate the guerrilla infrastructure and if (2) their propaganda campaign, which is being abetted by the declarations of the Pope and U Thant, collapsed.

Lodge requested instructions in respect to the Italian offer to renew the MARIGOLD exercise. His personal view is that a renewal now would be premature; that overeagerness tends to prolong the war; and that it is doubtful that the Polish Government can speak for Hanoi.

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163. On February 14, the Secretary replied to Fanfani's message (State's 136252 and B Aires 3083), emphasizing the reasons why we had delayed and finally resumed the bombing. The Secretary again expressed his gratitude for the role of Ambassador D'Orlandi and for the discretion of the Italian Government in the MARIGOLD exercise. The Secretary closed with the statement that we are a little at a loss to interpret Hanoi's attitude at the present time. We remain, he said, totally on the alert for any serious move on their part, and would welcome any indication Fanfani may receive.

164. On the same day, Lodge was informed that we would not wish to start up the MARIGOLD channel again, although we would be interested in whatever D'Orlandi reports from Lewandowski (State's 137000). Lodge was also told that we did not wish him to discuss the cessation of bombing with D'Orlandi.

165. On February 18, Lodge submitted another report itemizing VC initiated incidents within ten miles of Saigon (Saigon's 18329). He noted that the considerations involved in the commencement of this series of reports are no longer relevant. As a result, he was terminating the series.

166. On February 20, Lodge recalled that, at the time of the MARIGOLD discussions in Warsaw, we had informed Rapacki that we would cease bombing within ten miles of Hanoi (Saigon's 18535). He was asked to elicit reciprocal action on the part of the Communists. The spate of terrorist actions in the Saigon area, and the likelihood that there would be more, prompted Lodge to suggest that we consider informing Hanoi, via the Poles, that we no longer consider ourselves bound by the ten mile limit.

167. On February 21, Goldberg reported that Richard Hudson, the editor of War and Peace, had given the Mission for comments a copy of an article that he has written on the MARIGOLD subject for March publication. Hudson said he had many sources but, upon questioning, admitted nearly all were traceable back to the Poles. The article, despite a variety of inaccuracies, broadly covered the November-December discussions. Goldberg requested guidance in respect to talking to Hudson.

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168. On February 22, the Secretary told Goldberg that the proposed Hudson article would be extremely damaging; it would revive the controversy over the December events and put the President and the USG in a bad light. Accordingly, Goldberg was requested to see Hudson and make every possible effort to persuade him to withdraw it. The following line of argument was suggested:

1. no message was conveyed to us that Hanoi was prepared for negotiations or a bilateral exchange of views. Hanoi would denounce the Hudson article as it has denounced the Estabrook stories;
2. the Hudson article could have serious adverse effect on whatever elements in Hanoi that may desire some form of talks;
3. the story is in fact substantially misleading;
4. this kind of story puts the USG in an impossible position. If the USG tries to comment in depth on the article, it would run the serious risk of destroying any usefulness the Poles may ever have and, more seriously, of creating misunderstanding in Hanoi.

Goldberg was told that, if Hudson is clearly unwilling to withdraw the article, he should not provide comment or changes. On the other hand, it might be desirable to request that he print an accompanying comment along the following lines:

"Before publication, this article was shown personally to Ambassador Goldberg (or to Bill Bundy). He declined to comment on the text in detail, but did authorize the following general statement:

'The events of November and December of last year boil down in essence to the question whether any authoritative message was ever conveyed to

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the American Government that serious bilateral talks were possible. In our judgment, what was told to us, together with the difficulties and apparent conditions raised by the third nation involved, left us in grave doubt whether any such message by Hanoi was either intended or conveyed. We repeatedly sought clarification at the time, and we have done so since. No clear response has ever been forthcoming. The US has at all times made clear that it is prepared for discussions without prior conditions'."

169. In the absence of Goldberg, William Buffum on February 23 attempted to dissuade Hudson from publishing his proposed MARIGOLD article (USUN's 4119, February 24). Hudson responded to Buffum's argumentation by stating that he was first a "man of peace" and secondly a "journalist". He said his preliminary reaction was to continue his efforts to get the complete story and then to publish it. He had already rewritten part of his story based on additional details he had received from Polish and other sources. He said he did not agree with US policy and that he supported U Thant's three-point proposal. He wished to lay out the story in order to "put pressure on Washington to change its policy". Buffum concluded that Hudson would probably print his story. He suggested that it probably would attract attention to the story if we requested Hudson to print a rebuttal statement by us. [On February 24, the Secretary and Bundy agreed that we should not proceed with the idea of a rebuttal statement if Hudson prints his story.]

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170. On March 1, Kaiser reported from London that Vietnam was the subject of two conversations with Rapacki during the London visit (London's 6998). On February 22, Brown and Thompson got the strong impression that Rapacki felt he had taken a personal risk in the December project, had gotten burned, and was very disillusioned about the experience. He made it clear that on basis of this experience he had little interest in or hope for the initiatives undertaken during TET, and was not disposed to get burned again.

Rapacki's version of the December events was that, after a firm agreement on the original ten-point package, Lodge had re-neged by raising new questions and points of interpretations. Before the Poles had a chance to do anything with these, the December 13-14 bombings occurred, killing the entire project.

On the following day, Wilson asked Rapacki how the "misunderstanding" of November-December arose, observing that Lewandowski in Hanoi must have gone beyond what Lodge had said. Rapacki vehemently denied that any misunderstanding was possible. Lewandowski had gotten Lodge's approval of his written version of what Lodge had said. In response to Wilson's question why things went wrong, Rapacki "hinted" that sabotage by "Saigon hawks" was responsible.

On Wilson's suggestion, Rapacki agreed a more detailed post-mortem between the British and Poles would be useful. The British Embassy in Warsaw had subsequently been informed that the Poles would give them a more detailed account of their version. The UK Ambassador had been instructed only to listen.

When Wilson referred to the Harriman talks in Warsaw a year ago in respect to the possibility of misunderstanding, Rapacki was equally categorical in insisting there had been no misunderstanding or garble of Harriman's suggestions, stating that he had personally initialled the written record of the Harriman talks.

171. On March 1, Governor Harriman told Kaiser that he did not understand what Wilson referred to in raising the possibility that Rapacki had misunderstood Harriman's remarks during his visit to Warsaw in December 1965 (State's 146803). He said the Polish decision to send Michalowski to Hanoi was, he felt, in response to his request that they do what they could to get Hanoi to begin talks during the bombing pause.

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The misunderstanding that occurred was over Rapacki's contention that Ho Chi Minh's message of late January to a number of governments carried with it a positive signal to us. Neither the Governor nor anyone else connected with the USG saw the slightest indication of any give in Hanoi.

172. On March 3, Kaiser stated that Wilson's reference was apparently to the discrepant Polish versions of the Harriman conversations in subsequent meetings with Erlander and Heath referred to in Harriman's letter to Heath (State's 7799, June 27, 1966). Kaiser said he had been assured at the highest levels that the British are under no misapprehension as to the real story (London's 7080).

173. On March 6, Goldberg reported that on March 3 he had arranged a meeting in Saigon with D'Orlandi, with the agreement of and in the presence of Lodge (USUN's 4238). Goldberg's objective was to secure first-hand confirmation from an entirely independent source of the inaccuracy of the Polish version of the late November-December MARIGOLD events, i.e., that it was Lodge who had formulated the Ten Points proposal Lewandowski had transmitted to Hanoi, only to take the position subsequently that some of these points needed clarification. Without any prompting, D'Orlandi fully recited the course of events. His recital contained no discrepancies from the version we already had and he was quite categoric in stating that the Ten Points passed to Hanoi by Lewandowski had been formulated by Lewandowski himself.

Goldberg believed the D'Orlandi statement can be quite useful and important in setting the record straight with those who have received a distorted version from the Poles. While it would have been one thing for us to have formulated the Ten Points and then sought clarification, it was quite another thing to suggest that there were certain points in the formula proposed by Lewandowski which, in our view, would need to be clarified in further discussions.

Goldberg said that D'Orlandi is of the view, however, that the bombing of December 13-14 derailed the Warsaw talks. He also believes that it was a mistake to shift the venue to Warsaw.

174. On March 14, Goldberg met with Tormorowicz, the Polish Ambassador (USUN's 4390, March 15) and emphasized that the US

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highly valued the Polish efforts to help to end the Vietnam conflict. He said he personally considered it highly important that the US and Polish governments agree on the facts of the Marigold developments, even though our appraisal of the facts may differ. He then specifically raised the question of who formulated the Ten Points and cited D'Orlandi's testimony that it was Lewandowski. Tomorowicz said, in principle, the facts of this point as we understood them were quite accurate.

Tomorowicz's further comments, however, revealed three other points of difference with us: (1) when Lewandowski presented the Ten Points on December 1, Lodge said nothing about the need for clarification; (2) Lodge mentioned the need for clarification on December 3 (actually he cited this requirement on December 1 and again on December 3); (3) the Poles stressed the relationship between bombing and progress toward US-NVN talks from the December 1 meeting on. Tomorowicz said the Poles saw the developments in December as a further example of the US proclivity to destroy promising peace possibilities by accelerating military actions.

In rebutting Tomorowicz, Goldberg said the Poles should weigh carefully the assurance given the GOP that the December bombings were not related in intent, design or purpose to developments in respect to possible talks with the NVN. Moreover, it was followed by the concrete action in December of interdicting bombing within the ten-mile radius of Hanoi.

175. On March 15, Foreign Minister Fanfani gave our DCM in Rome a letter for the Secretary (Rome's 4767), conveying D'Orlandi's report to him after reviewing the Vietnam situation with Lewandowski. D'Orlandi claimed that, in present circumstances, a resumption of negotiations would require a three-week suspension of bombings and the admission, on the part of the USG, that it is still willing to accept the Ten Points. D'Orlandi added that the duration of the suspension could be kept secret and it should not be difficult to secure a substantive counterpart from Hanoi to be presented as a compensation for some other, purely token, concession from the US.

176. On March 16, Lodge's views were requested about the Fanfani message and he was requested to ask D'Orlandi for certain clarifications (State's 156826).

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177. Lodge responded on the same day, stating that D'Orlandi had left for Rome. He reported that, at D'Orlandi's farewell reception, Lewandowski had said to him "Well, anyway, no one can ever say that it was either your fault or my fault that conversations did not start". While recognizing that this could imply there was fault on the American side, D'Orlandi and Lodge felt that this comment was a reflection on the deplorable tactics used by Rapacki (Saigon's 20590).

178. On March 15, Embassy London was informed that we assumed that Rapacki's continuing vindictiveness would badly discolor the Polish contribution to a "more detailed post mortem" between the British and the Poles (State's 158246). To prepare a memorandum for British use, Kaiser was provided with extensive material dealing with Rapacki's two basic charges: (a) Lodge reneged after giving firm agreement to the Lewandowski Ten Point package; and (b) the December 13-14 bombing had sabotaged the entire project.

179. On March 17, Reinhardt was requested to convey the Secretary's sincere appreciation to D'Orlandi (State's 158132). He was to tell him that the Secretary would be most grateful if the Minister would let Reinhardt know when D'Orlandi reaches Rome so the two Ambassadors could discuss Lewandowski's approach. Reinhardt was to request clarification from D'Orlandi and to solicit his views on the desirability of a meeting between Lodge and Lewandowski.

180. On March 29, Reinhardt was also instructed to raise with D'Orlandi Hanoi's publication of the exchange of letters between the President and Ho and inquire whether there was anything in D'Orlandi's conversation with Lewandowski which might cast light on why Hanoi took this action (State's 164750).

181. On April 3, Kaiser reported that Murray of the Foreign Office had said that the material furnished met the British needs (London's 7977).

182. On April 7, D'Orlandi told Reinhardt that the possibility of achieving something through Lewandowski was good and should be pursued without undue delay. He believed the lesson of the last try was that more details should be clarified and nailed down through the Lewandowski channel before actual negotiations between the principals are initiated (Rome's 5266). In response to the specific questions raised in State's 156826, D'Orlandi stated:

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- a. The suspension of bombing should begin when he reached Hanoi and that 3-4 weeks would be required to allow sufficient time for the initial exchanges. The suspension would of course be without any commitment as to length.
- b. The "substantive contribution" of the DRV would be something in the military field.
- c. "Resumption of negotiations" meant the US-DRV, although the Rapacki/Gronouski stage could not be completely finessed if the venue is in Warsaw.
- d. "Accepting the Ten Points" would simply mean the reaffirmation of our December position including our reservations.
- e. Lewandowski had not expressed any views on DRV motivation in publishing the President Johnson-Ho exchange of letters.

183. On April 21, Reinhardt was informed of our appreciation for D'Orlandi's views (State's 180271). In order to explore Hanoi's position further, it was suggested that he meet with D'Orlandi and Lewandowski when the latter transits Rome in May. This was not to be a MARIGOLD postmortem but rather an analysis of the main elements in NVN calculations and a discussion of possible new approaches to issues of settlement. Also it might be useful to distinguish in this matter where Lewandowski ends and D'Orlandi begins, a problem inherent in MARIGOLD from the outset.

184. On April 20, Lodge was requested to have a final quiet talk with Lewandowski designed to (a) make him feel we are still interested in keeping contact with him in his new job at the UN and (b) determine whether he has any new ideas on possible approaches to Hanoi either by the Poles or others in Saigon or elsewhere (State's 179156).

It was suggested that Lodge raise with him (a) the Canadian proposal for a mutual withdrawal on either side of the 17th parallel; and (b) his reading as to why Hanoi never responded to our two phase possibility on bombing. Finally, he was to assure him categorically of our willingness to engage in direct talks at any time with Hanoi without preconditions.

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185. On April 22, Lodge, in a private meeting with Lewandowski, told him that we wanted to keep in touch, that we are wholeheartedly in favor of leaving no stone unturned for a just peace and that we are ready to talk at any time without preconditions (Saigon's 23719).

In response, Lewandowski said the thing that mattered was not the bombing on one side and infiltration on the other. The problem could only be solved by an agreement covering the general future of the whole area. Such an agreement would provide for the neutrality of North and South Viet-Nam. Lewandowski spoke derisively of the Canadian plan to withdraw from the DMZ, stating the problem would never be solved that way.

186. On April 21, the British passed to the Department a memorandum recounting the conversation of the UK Ambassador in Warsaw with Michalowski on April 4 (see British memorandum, dated April 17). The British suggested this closed out their "post-mortem". The Polish statement followed traditional lines. Michalowski attributed the failure of the Polish initiative to the intensification of US bombing, "which they felt was a deliberate action by the US military authorities in Saigon." It was his opinion that there had been a better chance to get the talks started in November than there had been either before or since. The December bombings had confirmed the North Vietnamese in all their suspicions that the Americans did not really want to start talks.

187. On May 8, the Associated Press carried a story on the November/December peace probes which was essentially accurate and largely favorable to the US position. At the same time the press carried rumors that the USG intended to release a "White Book" covering the Warsaw talks.

188. On May 9, Winuwicz and Michalowski expressed considerable concern to Gronouski about the possibility of a "war of White Books" on this subject (Warsaw's 2709), and Michalowski worried that publication of the Warsaw talks for propaganda reasons would limit the possibilities for future talks and close the Polish channel. Gronouski expressed the personal hope that we would not publish a "White Book". He felt it would add little to the Hightower story, would inspire an official Polish rebuttal, and would destroy the thin thread of hope that the Poles might in the future serve a useful intermediary role.

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189. On May 9, Gronouski was informed that we considered the news stories of the previous day on the December peace probes to be essentially accurate and reasonably favorable from our point of view (State's 190899). We would prefer to let the matter rest there avoiding to the extent feasible a public exchange of interpretations with the Polish Government. We had limited our public comments on the Hightower story to a background statement that we "would have no quarrel with it". Gronouski was instructed to inform Michalowski or other appropriate officials that we had no present intentions to publish a "White Book" on this subject. Simultaneously, he was to provide a flat assurance of our intention to continue our ardent search for a peaceful solution to the Vietnam conflict and our willingness to talk at any time without preconditions.

190. On the same day, Reinhardt asked if the Department, in view of the Hightower story, still wished him to attempt to see D'Orlandi and Lewandowski (Rome's 5909).

191. On May 10, Reinhardt was informed that the press stories had not altered our desire for him to meet with D'Orlandi and Lewandowski (State's 191174).

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